5 March 2024 in IET Communications
Malicious domains provide malware with covert communication channels which poses a severe threat to cybersecurity. Despite the continuous progress in detecting malicious domains with various machine learning algorithms, maintaining up‐to‐date various samples with fine‐labeled data for training is difficult. To handle these issues and improve the detection accuracy, a novel malicious domain detection method named MDND‐SS‐PO is proposed that combines semi‐supervised learning and parameter optimization. The contributions of the study are as follows. First, the method extracts the statistical features of the IP address, TTL value, the NXDomain record, and the domain name query characteristics to discriminate Domain‐Flux and Fast‐Flux domain names simultaneously. Second, an improved DBSCAN based on the neighborhood division is designed to cluster labeled data and unlabeled data with low time consumption. Then, based on the clustering hypothesis, unlabeled data is tagged with pseudo‐label according to the cluster results, which aims to train a supervised classifier effectively. Finally, Gaussian process regression is used to optimize parameter settings of the algorithm. And the Silhouette index and F1 score are introduced to evaluate the optimization results. Experimental results show that the proposed method achieved a precise detection performance of 0.885 when the ratio of labeled data is 5%.
23 April 2024 in IET Communications
The threat of Scan and Foothold Attack to the Network Edge (SFANE) is increasing, which greatly affects the application and development of edge computing network architecture. However, existing works focus on the implementation of specific technologies that resist the SFANE but ignore the effectiveness analysis of them. To overcome this limitation, this paper constructs probabilistic models for evaluating network edge's resistance against SFANE. In particular, the attacker models of the SFANE based on the ATT&CK model are first formalized. Afterward, according to the state‐of‐the‐art defense technologies, three different defense strategies are illustrated: no defense, address mutation, and fingerprint decoy. Subsequently, three different probabilistic models are constructed to provide a deeper analysis of the theoretical effect of these strategies on resisting the SFANE. Finally, the experimental results show that the actual defense effect of each strategy almost perfectly follows its probabilistic model.