Emre Yilmaz

Emre Yilmaz

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Emre Yilmaz

University of Houston-Downtown

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 April 2022
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
EYEmre Yilmaz
Emre Yilmaz
TJTianxi Ji
Tianxi Ji
EAErman Ayday
Erman Ayday
PLPan Li
Pan Li
Privacy-preserving genomic data sharing is prominent to increase the pace of genomic research, and hence to pave the way towards personalized genomic medicine. In this paper, we introduce (ε , T$)-dependent local differential privacy (LDP) for privacy-preserving sharing of correlated data and propose a genomic data sharing mechanism under this privacy definition. We first show that the original definition of LDP is not suitable for genomic data sharing, and then we propose a new mechanism to share genomic data. The proposed mechanism considers the correlations in data during data sharing, eliminates statistically unlikely data values beforehand, and adjusts the probability distributions for each shared data point accordingly. By doing so, we show that we can avoid an attacker from inferring the correct values of the shared data points by utilizing the correlations in the data. By adjusting the probability distributions of the shared states of each data point, we also improve the utility of shared data for the data collector. Furthermore, we develop a greedy algorithm that strategically identifies the processing order of the shared data points with the aim of maximizing the utility of the shared data. Our evaluation results on a real-life genomic dataset show the superiority of the proposed mechanism compared to the randomized response mechanism (a widely used technique to achieve LDP).

12 April 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
EYEmre Yilmaz
Emre Yilmaz
HFHakan Ferhatosmanoglu
Hakan Ferhatosmanoglu
EAErman Ayday
Erman Ayday
RARemzi Can Aksoy
Remzi Can Aksoy
Computer Engineering Department, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.(email:emre.yilmaz@cs.bilkent.edu.tr)

18 July 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TJTianxi Ji
Tianxi Ji
EAErman Ayday
Erman Ayday
EYEmre Yilmaz
Emre Yilmaz
PLPan Li
Pan Li
Database fingerprinting is widely adopted to prevent unauthorized data sharing and identify the source of data leakages. Although existing schemes are robust against common attacks, their robustness degrades significantly if attackers utilize inherent correlations among database entries. In this paper, we demonstrate the vulnerability of existing schemes by identifying different correlation attacks: column-wise correlation attack, row-wise correlation attack, and their integration. We provide robust fingerprinting against these attacks by developing mitigation techniques, which can work as post-processing steps for any off-the-shelf database fingerprinting schemes and preserve the utility of databases. We investigate the impact of correlation attacks and the performance of mitigation techniques using a real-world database. Our results show (i) high success rates of correlation attacks against existing fingerprinting schemes (e.g., integrated correlation attack can distort 64.8% fingerprint bits by just modifying 14.2% entries in a fingerprinted database), and (ii) high robustness of mitigation techniques (e.g., after mitigation, integrated correlation attack can only distort 3% fingerprint bits). Additionally, the mitigation techniques effectively alleviate correlation attacks even if (i) attackers have access to correlation models directly computed from the original database, while the database owner uses inaccurate correlation models, (ii) or attackers utilize higher order of correlations than the database owner.

1 October 2023 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YJYuzhou Jiang
Yuzhou Jiang
EYEmre Yilmaz
Emre Yilmaz
EAErman Ayday
Erman Ayday
Location-based services have brought significant convenience to people in their daily lives, and trajectory data are also in high demand. However, directly releasing those data raises privacy and liability (e.g., due to unauthorized distribution of such datasets) concerns since location data contain users' sensitive information, e.g., regular moving patterns and favorite spots. To address this, we propose a novel fingerprinting scheme that simultaneously identifies unauthorized redistribution of location trajectory datasets and provides differential privacy guarantees for shared data. Observing data utility degradation due to differentially private mechanisms, we introduce a utility-focused post-processing scheme to regain spatio-temporal correlations between points in a location trajectory. We further integrate this post-processing scheme into our fingerprinting scheme as a sampling method. The proposed fingerprinting scheme alleviates the degradation in the utility of the shared dataset due to the noise introduced by differentially private mechanisms (i.e., adds the fingerprint by preserving the publicly known statistics of the data). Meanwhile, it does not violate differential privacy throughout the entire process due to immunity to post-processing, a fundamental property of differential privacy. Our proposed fingerprinting scheme is robust against known and well-studied attacks against a fingerprinting scheme including random flipping attacks, correlation-based flipping attacks, and collusions among multiple parties, making it difficult for the attackers to infer the fingerprint codes and avoid accusation. Through experiments on two real-life location trajectory datasets and two synthetic ones, we show that our scheme achieves high fingerprint robustness and outperforms existing approaches. Furthermore, the proposed fingerprinting scheme increases data utility for differentially private datasets, which is beneficial to data analyzers.


7 October 2026
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
ANAlexander Nemecek
Alexander Nemecek
EYEmre Yilmaz
Emre Yilmaz
EAErman Ayday
Erman Ayday