Mariassunta Giannetti

Mariassunta Giannetti

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Mariassunta Giannetti

Stockholm School of Economics, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden; and Centre for Economic Policy Research, 75007 Paris, France; and European Corporate Governance Institute, 1000 Brussels, Belgium; and Swedish House of Finance, 11383 Stockholm, Sweden

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

26Years (2001-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 July 2015 in The Journal of Finance
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MGMariassunta Giannetti
Mariassunta Giannetti
GLGuanmin Liao
Guanmin Liao
XYXiaoyun Yu
Xiaoyun Yu

24 November 2008 in The Review of Financial Studies
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MGMariassunta Giannetti
Mariassunta Giannetti
MBMike Burkart
Mike Burkart
TETore Ellingsen
Tore Ellingsen
We relate trade credit to product characteristics and aspects of bank–firm relationships and document three main empirical regularities. First, the use of trade credit is associated with the nature of the transacted good. In particular, suppliers of differentiated products and services have larger accounts receivable than suppliers of standardized goods and firms buying more services receive cheaper trade credit for longer periods. Second, firms receiving trade credit secure financing from relatively uninformed banks. Third, a majority of the firms in our sample appear to receive trade credit at low cost. Additionally, firms that are more creditworthy and have some buyer market power receive larger early payment discounts.

1 March 2003 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
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MGMariassunta Giannetti
Mariassunta Giannetti
This paper examines how firm characteristics, legal rules, and financial development affect corporate finance decisions. In contrast to the existing literature, I use data on unlisted companies to show that institutions play an important role in determining the extent of agency problems. In particular, I find that in countries with good creditor protection, it is easier for firms investing in intangible assets to obtain loans. The protection of creditor rights is also important for ensuring access to long-term debt for firms operating in sectors with highly volatile returns. Ceteris paribus, firms are more leveraged in countries where the stock market is less developed. Unlisted firms appear more indebted than listed companies even after controlling for firm characteristics such as profitability, size, and the ability to provide collateral. Finally, institutions that favor creditor rights and ensure stricter enforcement not only are associated with higher leverage, but also with greater availability of long-term debt.

10 November 2016 in The Journal of Finance
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MGMariassunta Giannetti
Mariassunta Giannetti
TWTracy Yue Wang
Tracy Yue Wang

1 April 2012 in Journal of Financial Economics
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MGMariassunta Giannetti
Mariassunta Giannetti
LLLuc Laeven
Luc Laeven

1 February 2012 in Management Science
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MGMariassunta Giannetti
Mariassunta Giannetti
YYYishay Yafeh
Yishay Yafeh
We investigate whether cultural differences between professional decision makers affect financial contracts in a large data set of international syndicated bank loans. We find that more culturally distant lead banks offer borrowers smaller loans at a higher interest rate and are more likely to require third-party guarantees. These effects do not disappear following repeated interaction between borrower and lender and are economically sizable: A one-standard-deviation increase in cultural distance, approximately the distance between Canada and the United States or between Japan and South Korea, is associated with a 6.5 basis point higher loan spread; the loan spread increases by about 23 basis points if the bank-firm match involves culturally more distant parties, for example, from Japan and the United States. We also find that cultural differences not only affect the relation between borrower and lender, but also hamper risk sharing between participant banks and culturally distant lead banks. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, Teck Ho, and Terrance Odean, special issue editors.