John Roberto Sampe

John Roberto Sampe

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John Roberto Sampe

Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Australia

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 August 2026 in Jurnal Pembangunan Hukum Indonesia
Verified
Journal Article
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NTNesli Tamba
Nesli Tamba
YYYusriyadi Yusriyadi
Yusriyadi Yusriyadi
NRNur Rochaeti
Nur Rochaeti
JSJohn Roberto Sampe
John Roberto Sampe
The doctrine of state consent is a foundational pillar of the modern international legal order. This article critically evaluates the claim that consent functions as the primary basis of international law by tracing its operation in three principal areas: treaty law, international adjudication, and customary international law. It argues that the consent model is neither absolute nor applied in a uniform manner. Although the principle of sovereign equality under Article 2(1) of the UN Charter supports a voluntarist framework, a range of more flexible consent mechanisms such as treaty reservations and informal commitments enable states to shape the scope of their obligations. Even though jurisdiction before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is strictly anchored in consent, the “persistent objector” doctrine, controversies about the legitimacy of customary norms, and power imbalances within state practice expose underlying tensions in how consent is processed. The article further shows that states are not automatically bound by particular treaties or conventions; signing, for example, does not amount to a declaration of submission or a binding undertaking to an international convention or declaration. The conclusion is that, although state consent is indispensable, it operates within a contested normative framework formed as much by power disparities and geopolitical interests as by legal principles. This tension indicates that while state consent rests on the sovereign equality of states, power asymmetries can prevent that equality from being fully achieved in practice.