1 February 2017 in Journal of the Operational Research Society
19 August 2022 in International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications
Motivated by the growing consumer interest in new energy vehicles, this paper studies a manufacturer's pricing and channel selection issues when selling green products to environmentally conscious consumers. Three channel structures are examined: (1) a single agency selling channel, (2) a single reselling channel, and (3) dual channels of agency selling and reselling. Agency selling refers to the case in which the manufacturer directly sells products to consumers on the platform by paying a fixed fee. Reselling refers to when the manufacturer wholesales products to the platform, which is then responsible for selling to end consumers. We find that an increase in consumers' green awareness has a positive impact on green technology levels, retail prices, and the profits of the manufacturer, platform, and retailer. When consumers' green awareness and the revenue-sharing rate are relatively low, the manufacturer will choose the single reselling channel, which is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer. When consumers' green awareness is moderate, the manufacturer will choose the hybrid channel in which the manufacturer and platform will reach a win-win situation. When consumers' green awareness is high, the dual channel is simultaneously beneficial for the manufacturer, platform, and retailer, which reveals that Pareto optimisation occurs.
20 February 2019 in International Journal of Production Research
This paper focuses on pricing strategies, inventory policies for a supply chain when Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is adopted to cope with inventory inaccuracy. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer, in which the RFID tag price is shared between the supplier and the retailer. We present and compare the performance differences between a wholesale price contract and a consignment contract when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader and the supplier is the follower. Based on the optimal pricing and inventory decisions, an interesting observation of contract selection is that there are two critical values of inventory available rate such that when the inventory availability is less than the lower value, both the supplier and the retailer prefer a consignment contract; when the inventory availability is greater than the upper value, a wholesale price contract is their best choice; when the inventory availability is between the two values, the supplier prefers a wholesale price contract and the retailer prefers a consignment contract. Additionally, there exist threshold values of RFID tag price and sharing rate to determine the contract preference for the retailer. Furthermore, the profits of both the supplier and the retailer are independent of the RFID tag price sharing rate in a wholesale price contract, and the supplier has the incentive to invest in RFID tag cost in a consignment contract.
24 February 2016 in International Transactions in Operational Research
18 January 2019 in Operational Research
10 March 2018 in International Transactions in Operational Research