In a service exchange setting, the supply management literature generally assumes, with notable exceptions, the availability of complete information regarding supplier reliability. Highlighting the information asymmetry in supplier evaluation and using signaling theory, we argue that for a focal buyer, a supplier's downstream ego‐network instability, that is, other buyers' turnover in a supplier's network from one period to the next, acts as a signal of supplier unreliability, thereby reducing the price that the buyer pays to the supplier in a service exchange. Furthermore, we suggest that focal buyer–supplier relationship strength and structural equivalence weaken the negative effect of instability because the buyer has a more direct and positive experience with the supplier. Using a dataset of 3263 unique dyads formed by 260 buyers (shipoperators) and 493 suppliers (shipowners) during the 2000–2018 period in the container shipping charter market, we find support for our hypotheses, except for the contingent effect of structural equivalence. Our study contributes to signaling literature and network research by developing a supplier's downstream ego‐network instability as a salient heuristic for a focal buyer's pricing decisions. These findings equip buyer managers who may not accurately foresee supplier service quality in the charter market with a new supplier evaluation tool: a supplier's downstream ego‐network instability.
Decision makers switch between analytical-rational and intuitive-experiential approaches to decision making, a phenomenon termed “cognitive gear switching.” Such switching is crucial for decision making in any organization. However, how decision makers switch between the intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational approaches, the interplay between these approaches and contextual factors remains poorly understood. We study this in the context of decisions made in ongoing product-development projects, where we distinguish between the decision-making behavior of project managers and other project members. We show that project managers are more likely to switch decision-making approaches when faced with project uncertainty and, in such cases, to favor the analytical-rational approach. As such, we define project managers as “conditional cognitive switchers” and the strategy used as “rationally stepping up.”
The extant literature has demonstrated that physical distance negatively affects knowledge sharing, even within the same building. Moreover, the impact of physical barriers, such as doors and walls, has been flagged as an important avenue for research. We contribute to the micro-geography literature by unpacking the effects of physical barriers on knowledge sharing and moderators of that relationship. Based on micro-level, single-firm observational data on employees’ knowledge-sharing dyads, we find that physical barriers impede knowledge sharing after accounting for distance. Simultaneously, we theorise on and find evidence of several moderators of the negative relationship between physical barriers and knowledge sharing at the dyadic and individual levels: strong ties, participation in coordination mechanisms across departments, job autonomy, and location in an office near a printer room. The study has implications for managers in charge of office allocation and the physical layout of offices.
Research Summary: We contribute to theorizing global human resource strategy by analyzing the mobility of workers laid off due to the failure of a MNC employer. The job opportunities of laid‐off workers are affected by their industry legitimacy. Focusing on scarce specialized workers, we propose that prospective MNC employers share an interest in retaining such workers' legitimacy. However, in the light of organizational failure, they may suffer from cross‐border legitimacy loss conditioned by their former employer's MNC structure—specifically, their former organizational units or geographical locations. We present an illustrative case study of traders laid off by a spectacular bankruptcy in the global bunker industry. This inspires a discussion of how MNC top management can manipulate worker legitimacy following an organizational failure.Managerial Summary: Strategic hiring of globally mobile scarce specialized workers is central to global human resource strategy. We analyze what drives the legitimacy and mobility of such workers after being laid off by a bankruptcy of their former employer. We demonstrate that laid off workers experience comparatively high legitimacy loss when they were previously assigned to an MNC organizational unit or geographical location where other workers were suspected of being responsible for failure. This weakens their bargaining position vis‐a‐vis a prospective employer. We present an illustrative case study of traders laid off by a spectacular bankruptcy in the global bunker oil industry.