1 September 2018 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Trade-in remanufacturing is a commonly adopted business practice under which firms collect used products for remanufacturing by allowing repeat customers to trade in used products for upgraded ones at a discount price. This paper studies how customer purchasing behavior and remanufacturing efficiency affect the economic and environmental values of such a business practice. We demonstrate a new benefit of trade-in remanufacturing: it helps exploit the forward-looking behavior of strategic customers, which could be much more significant than the widely recognized revenue-generating and environmental benefits of remanufacturing. High remanufacturing efficiency does not necessarily benefit a firm. With overly high remanufacturing efficiency, product durability is so high that repeat customers are reluctant to trade in and upgrade their used products. When customers are highly strategic, trade-in remanufacturing creates a tension between profitability and sustainability: on one hand, by exploiting the intensive forward-looking customer behavior, trade-in remanufacturing is quite valuable to the firm; on the other hand, with highly strategic customers, trade-in remanufacturing has a substantial negative impact on the environment and social welfare, since it may induce significantly higher production quantities without improving customer surplus. With nearly myopic customers, however, trade-in remanufacturing benefits both the firm and the environment. Therefore, understanding the interactions between customer purchasing behavior and trade-in remanufacturing is important to both firms and policy makers. Finally, to resolve the above tension, we study how a social planner (e.g., government) should design a public policy to maximize social welfare. The social optimum can be achieved by using a simple linear subsidy/tax scheme for both new production and remanufacturing. The proposed policy can also induce the firm to set the socially optimal remanufacturing efficiency. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0696 .
1 July 2022 in Management Science
When a weak-brand firm and a strong-brand firm source from a common contract manufacturer, the weak-brand firm may advertise this relationship to promote its own product. This paper investigates whether the weak-brand firm should use such brand spillover as a marketing strategy and how this decision depends on the firms’ characteristics and market conditions. We develop a game theoretic model consisting of one contract manufacturer and two firms with asymmetric brand power. The contract manufacturer determines the wholesale prices for the two firms and then each firm decides whether to source from the contract manufacturer. If both firms outsource to the contract manufacturer, then the weak-brand firm may choose whether to promote its product through brand spillover. Although brand spillover improves the attractiveness of the weak-brand firm’s product at no cost, we find that the weak-brand firm should not use brand spillover if (1) its original brand power is sufficiently low or (2) the contract manufacturer does not have a significant cost advantage. Interestingly, the adoption of brand spillover by the weak-brand firm can benefit all three parties under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, when the contract manufacturer has a significant cost advantage, in equilibrium the strong-brand firm will be hurt by brand spillover and hence should take actions to prevent it. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing.
1 July 2019 in Management Science
This paper studies the potential benefits of responsive pricing and demand learning to sellers of seasonal fashion goods. As typical in such markets, demand uncertainty is high at the beginning of a season, but there is a potential opportunity to learn about demand via early sales observations. Additionally, although the consumers have general preference for purchasing a fashion product earlier rather than later in the season, they may exhibit strategic behavior—contemplating the benefits of postponing their purchase in anticipation of end-of-season discounts. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of responsive pricing, in comparison with a benchmark case of a fixed-price policy, depend sharply on the nature of the consumers’ behavior. Interestingly, in stark contrast to markets of myopic consumers, when the consumers are all strategic, the benefits of responsive pricing tend to worsen when there is a higher potential for learning. We explain this counterintuitive outcome by pointing to two phenomena: the spread effect and information shaping. For example, sellers of fashion products that consider upgrading their pricing systems to incorporate “accurate response” strategies (i.e., integrating learning and responsive pricing) should be aware of the possibility that such action might lead them to a new and potentially worse equilibrium, particularly when there is a higher opportunity to learn. Despite the fact that price commitment completely eliminates the seller’s ability to learn, it appears to increasingly dominate responsive pricing as the portion of strategic consumers in the market increases. But, although performing better than responsive pricing, a price-commitment policy is typically limited in performing effective discrimination. Finally, we studied the potential benefits of quick response strategies—ones that embed both dynamic pricing and quick inventory replenishment during the sales season—and found that they are particularly significant under strategic consumer behavior. We explain this result by arguing that quick response provides the seller with a real option that serves as an effective implicit threat to the consumers: encouraging them to buy earlier at premium prices rather than wait for discounts at the end of the season. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3114 . This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management.
1 November 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: We study how algorithmic (versus human-based) task assignment processes change task recipients’ fairness perceptions and productivity. Academic/practical relevance: Since algorithms are widely adopted by businesses and often require human involvement, understanding how humans perceive algorithms is instrumental to the success of algorithm design in operations. Particularly, the growing concern that algorithms may reproduce inequality historically exhibited by humans calls for research about how people perceive the fairness of algorithmic decision making (relative to traditional human-based decision making) and, consequently, adjust their work behaviors. Methodology: In a 15-day-long field experiment with Alibaba Group in a warehouse where workers pick products following orders (or “pick lists”), we randomly assigned half of the workers to receive pick lists from a machine that ostensibly relied on an algorithm to distribute pick lists, and the other half to receive pick lists from a human distributor. Results: Despite that we used the same underlying rule to assign pick lists in both groups, workers perceive the algorithmic (versus human-based) assignment process as fairer by 0.94–1.02 standard deviations. This yields productivity benefits: receiving tasks from an algorithm (versus a human) increases workers’ picking efficiency by 15.56%–17.86%. These findings persist beyond the first day when workers were involved in the experiment, suggesting that our results are not limited to the initial phrase when workers might find algorithmic assignment novel. We replicate the main results in another field experiment involving a nonoverlapping sample of warehouse workers. We also show via online experiments that people in the United States also view algorithmic task assignment as fairer than human-based task assignment. Managerial implications: We demonstrate that algorithms can have broader impacts beyond offering greater efficiency and accuracy than humans: introducing algorithmic assignment processes may enhance fairness perceptions and productivity. This insight can be utilized by managers and algorithm designers to better design and implement algorithm-based decision making in operations. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1120 .
1 September 2016 in Production and Operations Management
28 February 2018 in Production and Operations Management