Countries with endemic polio have revised emergency action plans to innovate and intensify strategies to reach and vaccinate every child in underimmunized populations.
Trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) was globally replaced with bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) in April 2016 ("the switch"). Many outbreaks of paralytic poliomyelitis associated with type 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) have been reported since this time. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) to guide countries experiencing cVDPV2 outbreaks to implement timely and effective outbreak response (OBR). To assess the possible role of compliance with SOPs in successfully stopping cVDPV2 outbreaks, we analyzed data on critical timelines in the OBR process. Data were collected on all cVDPV2 outbreaks detected for the period April 1, 2016 and December 31, 2020 and all outbreak responses to those outbreaks between April 1, 2016 and December 31, 2021. We conducted secondary data analysis using the GPEI Polio Information System database, records from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Polio Laboratory, and meeting minutes of the monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2) Advisory Group. Date of notification of circulating virus was defined as Day 0 for this analysis. Extracted process variables were compared with indicators in the GPEI SOP version 3.1. One hundred and eleven cVDPV2 outbreaks resulting from 67 distinct cVDPV2 emergences were reported during April 1, 2016-December 31, 2020, affecting 34 countries across four World Health Organization Regions. Out of 65 OBRs with the first large-scale campaign (R1) conducted after Day 0, only 12 (18.5%) R1s were conducted by the target of 28 days after Day 0. Of the 89 OBRs with the second large-scale campaign (R2) conducted after Day 0, 30 (33.7%) R2s were conducted by the target of 56 days after Day 0. Twenty-three (31.9%) of the 72 outbreaks with isolates dated after Day 0 were stopped within the 120-day target. Since "the switch", delays in OBR implementation were evident in many countries, which may be related to the persistence of cVDPV2 outbreaks >120 days. To achieve timely and effective response, countries should follow GPEI OBR guidelines.
6 October 2020 in Health Research Policy and Systems
Background: Countries are transitioning assets and functions from polio eradication to integrated immunization and surveillance activities. We assessed the extent of linkages between and perceptions of National Immunization Technical Advisory Groups (NITAGs) and National Certification Committees (NCCs) for polio eradication to understand how linkages can be leveraged to improve efficiencies of these expert bodies. Methods: During May 2017 to May 2018, we administered a 15-question survey to a NITAG chair or member and an NCC counterpart in all countries of the WHO Regions for Africa (AFR) and for the Eastern Mediterranean (EMR) that had both a NITAG and an NCC. Data were analysed using frequency distributions. Results: Of countries with both a NITAG and an NCC (n = 44), the response rate was 92% (22/24) in AFR and 75% (15/20) in EMR. Some respondents reported being very familiar with the functions of the other technical bodies, 36% (8/22) for NITAG members and 38% (14/37) for NCC members. Over 85% (51/59) of respondents felt it was somewhat useful or very useful to strengthen ties between bodies. Nearly all respondents (98%, 58/59) felt that NCC expertise could inform measles and rubella elimination programmes. Conclusions: We observed a broad consensus that human resource assets of NCCs may serve an important technical role to support national immunization policy-making. At this stage of the polio eradication initiative, countries should consider how to integrate the technical expertise of NCC members to reinforce NITAGs and maintain the polio essential functions, beginning in countries that have been polio-free for several years.