1 January 2014 in Production and Operations Management
1 July 2019 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: Servicization is a business strategy to sell the functionality of a product rather than the product itself. It has been touted as an environmentally friendly strategy as it encourages manufacturers to take more responsibility for their products. We study when servicization results in a win-win outcome where it can simultaneously increase a firm’s profits and decrease its environmental impact compared with selling products. Academic/practical relevance: Whereas policy planners are interested in strategies that reduce environmental impact, firms are unlikely to embrace them if they are not profitable. Hence, understanding when servicization results in a win-win outcome is critical both for firms and for policy makers. Methodology: We construct a stylized game-theoretic model that takes into account several key dynamics not accounted for in prior literature. In particular, we allow the servicizing firm to tailor the service to consumers’ needs, endogenize product durability choice, and also use an environmental impact metric that captures the low discretionary use nature of products. Results: For products that have a low use impact relative to their production and disposal impacts, servicization can be a win-win strategy only if the firm has sufficiently high operating efficiency. By contrast, for products that have a high use impact relative to their production and disposal impacts, servicization can be a win-win strategy only if the firm has sufficiently low operating efficiency and the consumer segments are adequately similar. Furthermore, servicization can improve consumer welfare and simultaneously improve profitability and environmental impact only for products with a low relative use impact. Managerial implications: Whether servicization leads to a win-win outcome cannot simply be determined by changes in product durability, as often argued. It critically depends on the firm’s relative operating efficiency, environmental impact of product in its use phase relative to the production and disposal phases, and the similarity of consumer segments. Our results explicitly characterize these relations.
1 July 2012 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
We consider a firm that sells two vertically (quality) differentiated products to strategically forward-looking consumers over two periods, setting the prices dynamically in each period. The consumers are heterogeneous in their evaluations of quality, and strategic in that they decide not only whether and which product variant to buy, but also when to buy, choosing the option that maximizes their utility. We derive the equilibrium of the pricing-purchasing game between the firm and the consumers. We find that the loss due to strategic customer behavior can be less with two product variants compared to the single-product benchmark, which indicates that product variety can serve as a lever when dealing with strategic customers. This benefit exists when the additional product has an inferior cost-to-quality ratio. Because of this benefit, a firm may find it attractive to sell a product variant that would be unprofitable otherwise. However, product variety can also hurt profitability due to strategic customer behavior: A product variant that would be profitable absent strategic customers can in fact be unprofitable. This can happen when customer impatience and firm costs are moderate.
1 January 2014 in Production and Operations Management
1 December 2008 in Management Science
We study a market with customers who have heterogeneous preferences for product attributes. We consider two types of firms that compete on price and product variety: A traditional firm, which chooses a limited set of product configurations, and a customizing firm, which can produce any configuration to order. The traditional firm carries product inventories and experiences a lead-time delay. The customizing firm does not carry inventory, and its customers incur waiting costs until they receive their orders. We assume that the customizing firm has limited capacity in the short run (e.g., when it does not outsource production to high-volume manufacturers). We derive the equilibrium for a duopoly competition between the customizing firm and the traditional firm, study its characteristics, and compare it to a monopoly. We characterize conditions that favor customization under competition. We find that the customizing firm's profit is not monotone in the market size and its ease of customization. Similarly, a decline in the traditional firm's holding cost may increase or decrease its profit. We show that the unit cost differential between the firms crucially affects the customizing firm's ideal market size, its returns from expanding capacity, its product variety, and the way operational improvements affect its performance.
1 July 2008 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
We consider a duopoly market with heterogeneous customer tastes. The firms play a two-stage game. First, each firm chooses whether to invest in mass customization, which would enable it to offer customized products that increasingly match each customer's ideal product as the chosen customization level increases. A firm that chooses not to invest in mass customization serves a standard product. Second, the firms competitively price their product lines. We characterize each firm's investment in mass customization and study its dependence on competitive position, as determined by its cost efficiency and perceived quality vis-à-vis its competitor. We find that the value of mass customization critically depends on the firm's competitive position. It may not be desirable even at zero cost due to its negative effect on price competition. A firm with an overall cost and quality disadvantage never unilaterally adopts mass customization. We show that allowing firms to set different prices for each product configuration leads to a broader adoption of mass customization compared to when they are restricted to uniform prices. However, a firm's chosen customization level may be higher with uniform prices. Our analysis also helps a customizing firm determine whether to target its process improvement efforts for a lower cost or a higher customization level.