28 August 2013 in Philosophical Psychology
There are (at least) two ways to think of the differences in basic concepts and typologies that one can find in the different scientific practices that constitute a research tradition. One is the fundamentalist view: the fewer the better. The other is a non-fundamentalist view of science whereby the integration of different concepts into the right abstraction grounds an explanation that is not grounded as the sum of the explanations supported by the parts. Integrative concepts are often associated with idealizations that can successfully set the stage for different phenomena to be compared or for explanations of different phenomena to be considered as jointly increasing our understanding of reality beyond that which each explanation provides separately. In this paper, our aim is to argue for the importance of the notions of an “affordance” and “scaffolding” as integrative concepts in the cognitive sciences. The integrational role of the concept of affordance is closely related with the capacity of affordances to generate the scaffoldings leading to the integration. The capacities of affordances that turn them into (stable) scaffoldings explain why such notions are often used interchangeably (as we shall see). On this basis, we aim to show that the concepts of affordance and scaffolding provide the sort of epistemic perspective that can overcome common complaints about the limits and unity of the cognitive sciences once claims about extended cognition are taken seriously.
1 July 2011 in Philosophy of Science
In the philosophy of science, abstraction has usually been analyzed in terms of the interface between our experience and the design of our concepts. The often implicit assumption here is that such interface has a definite identifiable and universalizable structure, determining the epistemic correctness of any abstraction. Our claim is that, on the contrary, the epistemic grounding of abstraction should not be reduced to the structural norms of such interface but is also related to the constraints on the cognitive processes of specific abstractions. This suggests that we should understand abstraction as embodied in different kinds of abstraction practices.
25 September 2018 in Adaptive Behavior
From an enactive perspective, one should be able to explain how perception and actions, constituted in patterns of interactions with the world, evolve into the capacities for social coordination and social understanding distinctive of human beings. Traditional accounts of our social understanding skills, focusing on the role of intentionality as the “aboutness” associated with the use of symbolic language, make this sort of explanation difficult to articulate. A satisfactory explanation should start with the recognition that intentionality is not a monolithic phenomenon and that more basic kinds of intentionality embodied in material culture have played a crucial role in allowing for the complexity of human social cognition. We argue for the importance of kinds of bottom-up intentionality, which arise from the world as it is experienced, dynamically structuring and directing our cognitive capacities toward possibilities of (joint) action. Musicality (our capacity for being musical) is a particularly rich kind of cultural expression, in which intentionality embodied in material culture can be studied and its significance for the structure of our deeply social cognition can be explored.
1 January 1990 in Synthese
1 January 2004 in Journal of Cognition and Culture
We examine two major perspectives in the literature on domain specificity in cognition: in one of them cognitive modules are "intuitive theories"; in the other they are dispositional structures. Both of these positions accept that there is a continuous line from ordinary to scientific reasoning; nevertheless they interpret this continuity differently. We propose an alternative way of understanding the relation between ordinary and scientific reasoning: the continuity thesis holds because heuristic structures play a fundamental role in both types of reasoning. Our main contention is that cognitive modules can be thought of as heuristic structures and that, since science is a complex of practices that embody different heuristic structures, science should be understood as a complex of cognitive modules.
1 January 1992 in Diánoia
En esta época de la publicación de Diánoia no se incluían resúmenes.