Dan Bang

Dan Bang

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Dan Bang

Fralin Biomedical Research Institute, Virginia Tech, Roanoke, VA, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2014 in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
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Journal Article
Open access
NSNicholas Shea
Nicholas Shea
ABAnnika Boldt
Annika Boldt
DBDan Bang
Dan Bang
NYNick Yeung
Nick Yeung
CHCecilia Heyes
Cecilia Heyes
CFChris D. Frith
Chris D. Frith
The human mind is extraordinary in its ability not merely to respond to events as they unfold but also to adapt its own operation in pursuit of its agenda. This 'cognitive control' can be achieved through simple interactions among sensorimotor processes, and through interactions in which one sensorimotor process represents a property of another in an implicit, unconscious way. So why does the human mind also represent properties of cognitive processes in an explicit way, enabling us to think and say 'I'm sure' or 'I'm doubtful'? We suggest that 'system 2 metacognition' is for supra-personal cognitive control. It allows metacognitive information to be broadcast, and thereby to coordinate the sensorimotor systems of two or more agents involved in a shared task.

21 May 2018 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
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DBDan Bang
Dan Bang
SFStephen M. Fleming
Stephen M. Fleming
Significance: Recent computational models propose that our sense of confidence in a choice reflects an estimate of the probability that the choice is correct. However, it has proven difficult to experimentally separate decision confidence from its component parts, such as our certainty about perceptual evidence or choice requirements. We have devised a task to dissociate these quantities and isolate a distinct encoding of decision confidence in the medial prefrontal cortex of the human brain. We show that activity in this area not only tracks expected performance on a task, but also is related to both within-subject and between-subject variation in a subjective sense of confidence. Our study illuminates why dysfunctional confidence often emerges following damage to the prefrontal cortex.

8 August 2016 in Autism Research
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RFRiccardo Fusaroli
Riccardo Fusaroli
ALAnna Lambrechts
Anna Lambrechts
DBDan Bang
Dan Bang
DBDermot M. Bowler
Dermot M. Bowler
SGSebastian B. Gaigg
Sebastian B. Gaigg

5 September 2012 in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
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Journal Article
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YMYina Ma
Yina Ma
DBDan Bang
Dan Bang
CWChenbo Wang
Chenbo Wang
MAMicah Allen
Micah Allen
CFChris Frith
Chris Frith
SHShihui Han
Shihui Han
Western cultures encourage self-construals independent of social contexts, whereas East Asian cultures foster interdependent self-construals that rely on how others perceive the self. How are culturally specific self-construals mediated by the human brain? Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we monitored neural responses from adults in East Asian (Chinese) and Western (Danish) cultural contexts during judgments of social, mental and physical attributes of themselves and public figures to assess cultural influences on self-referential processing of personal attributes in different dimensions. We found that judgments of self vs a public figure elicited greater activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in Danish than in Chinese participants regardless of attribute dimensions for judgments. However, self-judgments of social attributes induced greater activity in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) in Chinese than in Danish participants. Moreover, the group difference in TPJ activity was mediated by a measure of a cultural value (i.e. interdependence of self-construal). Our findings suggest that individuals in different sociocultural contexts may learn and/or adopt distinct strategies for self-reflection by changing the weight of the mPFC and TPJ in the social brain network.

16 August 2017 in Royal Society Open Science
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Journal Article
Open access
DBDan Bang
Dan Bang
CFChris D. Frith
Chris D. Frith
We review the literature to identify common problems of decision-making in individuals and groups. We are guided by a Bayesian framework to explain the interplay between past experience and new evidence, and the problem of exploring the space of hypotheses about all the possible states that the world could be in and all the possible actions that one could take. There are strong biases, hidden from awareness, that enter into these psychological processes. While biases increase the efficiency of information processing, they often do not lead to the most appropriate action. We highlight the advantages of group decision-making in overcoming biases and searching the hypothesis space for good models of the world and good solutions to problems. Diversity of group members can facilitate these achievements, but diverse groups also face their own problems. We discuss means of managing these pitfalls and make some recommendations on how to make better group decisions.

30 October 2015 in PLOS Computational Biology
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LALaurence Aitchison
Laurence Aitchison
DBDan Bang
Dan Bang
BBBahador Bahrami
Bahador Bahrami
PLPeter E Latham
Peter E Latham
Humans stand out from other animals in that they are able to explicitly report on the reliability of their internal operations. This ability, which is known as metacognition, is typically studied by asking people to report their confidence in the correctness of some decision. However, the computations underlying confidence reports remain unclear. In this paper, we present a fully Bayesian method for directly comparing models of confidence. Using a visual two-interval forced-choice task, we tested whether confidence reports reflect heuristic computations (e.g. the magnitude of sensory data) or Bayes optimal ones (i.e. how likely a decision is to be correct given the sensory data). In a standard design in which subjects were first asked to make a decision, and only then gave their confidence, subjects were mostly Bayes optimal. In contrast, in a less-commonly used design in which subjects indicated their confidence and decision simultaneously, they were roughly equally likely to use the Bayes optimal strategy or to use a heuristic but suboptimal strategy. Our results suggest that, while people’s confidence reports can reflect Bayes optimal computations, even a small unusual twist or additional element of complexity can prevent optimality. Confidence plays a key role in group interactions: when people express an opinion, they almost always communicate—either implicitly or explicitly—their confidence, and the degree of confidence has a strong effect on listeners. Understanding both how confidence is generated and how it is interpreted are therefore critical for understanding group interactions. Here we ask: how do people generate their confidence? A priori, they could use a heuristic strategy (e.g. their confidence could scale more or less with the magnitude of the sensory data) or what we take to be an optimal strategy (i.e. their confidence is a function of the probability that their opinion is correct). We found, using Bayesian model selection, that confidence reports reflect probability correct, at least in more standard experimental designs. If this result extends to other domains, it would provide a relatively simple interpretation of confidence, and thus greatly extend our understanding of group interactions.