From bottom to top: The doubling of the number of transistors on a chip every 2 years, a seemly inevitable trend that has been called Moore's law, has contributed immensely to improvements in computer performance. However, silicon-based transistors cannot get much smaller than they are today, and other approaches should be explored to keep performance growing. Leisersonet al.review recent examples and argue that the most promising place to look is at the top of the computing stack, where improvements in software, algorithms, and hardware architecture can bring the much-needed boost.Science, this issue p.eaam9744
Deep learning's recent history has been one of achievement: from triumphing over humans in the game of Go to world-leading performance in image classification, voice recognition, translation, and other tasks. But this progress has come with a voracious appetite for computing power. This article catalogs the extent of this dependency, showing that progress across a wide variety of applications is strongly reliant on increases in computing power. Extrapolating forward this reliance reveals that progress along current lines is rapidly becoming economically, technically, and environmentally unsustainable. Thus, continued progress in these applications will require dramatically more computationally-efficient methods, which will either have to come from changes to deep learning or from moving to other machine learning methods.
The risks posed by artificial intelligence (AI) concern academics, auditors, policymakers, AI companies, and the public. Researchers, policymakers, and technology companies discuss AI risks using inconsistent terminology—the same word may describe different problems, while different words describe identical concerns. This fragmentation impedes coordinated responses to AI challenges. We address this by creating the AI Risk Repository: a living database of 1,725 risks extracted from 74 existing taxonomies and frameworks. We organize these risks using two complementary classification systems. The Causal Taxonomy classifies risks by their origins: which entity causes them (human or AI), whether intentional, and when they occur (before or after deployment). The Domain Taxonomy classifies risks by their effects across seven areas, from discrimination and privacy violations to misinformation and weapons development. This shared reference enables more coordinated approaches to discussing, researching, auditing, and governing AI systems across sectors and jurisdictions.
Deep learning's recent history has been one of achievement: from triumphing over humans in the game of Go to world-leading performance in image classification, voice recognition, translation, and other tasks. But this progress has come with a voracious appetite for computing power. This article catalogs the extent of this dependency, showing that progress across a wide variety of applications is strongly reliant on increases in computing power. Extrapolating forward this reliance reveals that progress along current lines is rapidly becoming economically, technically, and environmentally unsustainable. Thus, continued progress in these applications will require dramatically more computationally-efficient methods, which will either have to come from changes to deep learning or from moving to other machine learning methods.
The faster AI automation spreads through the economy, the more profound its potential impacts, both positive (improved productivity) and negative (worker displacement). The previous literature on “AI Exposure” cannot predict this pace of automation since it attempts to measure an overall potential for AI to affect an area, not the technical feasibility and economic attractiveness of building such systems. In this article, we present a new type of AI task automation model that is end-to-end, estimating: the level of technical performance needed to do a task, the characteristics of an AI system capable of that performance, and the economic choice of whether to build and deploy such a system. The result is a first estimate of which tasks are technically feasible and economically attractive to automate - and which are not. We focus on computer vision, where cost modeling is more developed. We find that at today’s costs U.S. businesses would choose not to automate most vision tasks that have “AI Exposure,” and that only 23% of worker wages being paid for vision tasks would be attractive to automate. This slower roll-out of AI can be accelerated if costs falls rapidly or if it is deployed via AI-as-a-service platforms that have greater scale than individual firms, both of which we quantify. Overall, our findings suggest that AI job displacement will be substantial, but also gradual – and therefore there is room for policy and retraining to mitigate unemployment impacts.