Kim K. Miskiw

Kim K. Miskiw

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Kim K. Miskiw

Institute of Information Systems and Marketing, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
25 February 2025 in Energy Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KMKim K. Miskiw
Kim K. Miskiw
EKEmil Kraft
Emil Kraft
SFStein-Erik Fleten
Stein-Erik Fleten


2 December 2023
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
FMFlorian Maurer
Florian Maurer
KMKim K. Miskiw
Kim K. Miskiw
RRRebeca Ramirez
Rebeca Ramirez
NHNick Harder
Nick Harder
VSVolker Sander
Volker Sander
SLSebastian Lehnhoff
Sebastian Lehnhoff

14 August 2025 in Journal of Open Source Software
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
FMFlorian Maurer
Florian Maurer
NHNick Harder
Nick Harder
KMKim K. Miskiw
Kim K. Miskiw
MKManish Khanra
Manish Khanra
ASSUME is an open-source toolbox for agent-based simulations of various energy markets, with a primary focus on European electricity markets. Developed as an open-source model, its objectives are to ensure usability and customizability for a wide range of users and use cases in the energy system modeling community. A unique feature of the ASSUME toolbox is its integration of Deep Reinforcement Learning methods into the behavioral strategies of market agents. The model offers various predefined agent representations for both the demand and generation sides, which can be used as plugand-play modules, simplifying the usage of reinforcement learning strategies. This setup enables research of new market designs and evolving dynamics in energy markets.

15 September 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
KMKim K. Miskiw
Kim K. Miskiw
AAAhmed Alahmed
Ahmed Alahmed
SHShannon Y.S. Hwang
Shannon Y.S. Hwang
ABAudun Botterud
Audun Botterud
PSPhilipp Staudt
Philipp Staudt
Increasing electrification of consumer energy consumption is placing growing stress on distribution grids, inducing local demand peaks that cause congestion. Time-dependent electricity tariffs can exacerbate this issue, as they move demand to better match supply but rarely account for distribution grid impacts. To address this issue, distribution system operators need mechanisms at their disposal to alter demand. Yet, the consequences and interdependences that are created through these mechanisms remain elusive. We therefore compare two important families of such mechanisms, peak charges and direct load control, and show how they may induce strategic consumer behavior. We use game theory to derive analytic solutions of consumer behavior and subsequently apply deep reinforcement learning to analyze more complex settings. Peak charges can theoretically eliminate demand peaks by incentivizing consumers to flatten aggregate demand if peaks are anticipated and prices are set correctly. Setting appropriate peak charges is challenged by time-dependent electricity tariffs. Direct load control mitigates peaks by coercing consumers to shift demand in order to avoid curtailment. It is less reliant on peak anticipation and price setting. It is robust to behavioral uncertainty and price volatility, but may only curtail a subset of consumers rather than those for whom demand shifting is least costly. In turn, this may result in economic efficiency losses. We provide guidance to policy researchers and practitioners by systematically outlining the resulting tradeoffs between the two mechanisms.

29 July 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
KMKim K. Miskiw
Kim K. Miskiw
AAAhmed Alahmed
Ahmed Alahmed
SHShannon Y.S. Hwang
Shannon Y.S. Hwang
ABAudun Botterud
Audun Botterud
PSPhilipp Staudt
Philipp Staudt
Increasing electrification of consumer energy consumption is placing growing stress on distribution grids, inducing local demand peaks that cause congestion. Time-dependent electricity tariffs can exacerbate this issue, as they move demand to better match supply but rarely account for distribution grid impacts. To address this issue, distribution system operators need mechanisms at their disposal to alter demand. Yet, the consequences and interdependences that are created through these mechanisms remain elusive. We therefore compare two important families of such mechanisms, peak charges and direct load control, and show how they may induce strategic consumer behavior. We use game theory to derive analytic solutions of consumer behavior and subsequently apply deep reinforcement learning to analyze more complex settings. Peak charges can theoretically eliminate demand peaks by incentivizing consumers to flatten aggregate demand if peaks are anticipated and prices are set correctly. Setting appropriate peak charges is challenged by time-dependent electricity tariffs. Direct load control mitigates peaks by coercing consumers to shift demand in order to avoid curtailment. It is less reliant on peak anticipation and price setting. It is robust to behavioral uncertainty and price volatility, but may only curtail a subset of consumers rather than those for whom demand shifting is least costly. In turn, this may result in economic efficiency losses. We provide guidance to policy researchers and practitioners by systematically outlining the resulting tradeoffs between the two mechanisms.