Alerts reported by intrusion detection systems (IDSes) are often the starting points for attack campaign discovery and response procedures. However, the sheer number of alerts compared to the number of real attacks, along with the complexity of alert investigations, poses a challenge to achieving effective alert triage with limited computational resources. Automated procedures and human analysts could suffer from the burden of analyzing floods of alerts, and fail to respond to critical alerts promptly. To scale out the alert processing capability in enterprises, we present RAPID, a real-time alert investigation system to aid analysts perform provenance analysis tasks around alerts in an efficient and collaborative manner. RAPID is built based on two key insights: 1) space and time efficiency of alert investigations can be improved by avoiding the significant overlap between alert triage tasks; 2) prioritization of alert triage tasks should be dynamic to adapt to the newly discovered context. In doing so, RAPID maximizes the utilization of limited computation resources and time, and reacts to the most critical reasoning steps in a timely manner. More specifically, RAPID employs an interruptible tracking algorithm that efficiently uncovers the causal connections between alerts and propagates priorities based on the connections. Unlike prior work, RAPID does not rely on knowledge of existing threat ontologies and focuses on providing a general concurrent alert investigation platform with provenance analysis capabilities. We evaluate RAPID on a 1TB dataset from DARPA Transparent Computing (TC) program with 411 million events, including three attack campaigns. The results show that RAPID is able to improve space efficiency by up to three orders of magnitude and reduce the time of alert provenance analysis to discover all the major attack traces by up to 99%.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is widely recognized as the essential protocol for securing Internet communications. While numerous studies have focused on investigating server certificates used in TLS connections, our study delves into the less explored territory of mutual TLS (mTLS) where both parties need to provide certificates to each other. By utilizing TLS connection logs collected from a large campus network over 23 months, we identify over 2.2 million unique server certificates and over 3.4 million unique client certificates used in over 1.2 billion mutual TLS connections. By jointly analyzing TLS connection data (e.g., port numbers) and certificate data (e.g., issuers for server/client certificates), we quantify the prevalent use of untrusted certificates and uncover potential security concerns resulting from misconfigured certificates, sharing of certificates between servers and clients, and long-expired certificates. Furthermore, we present the first in-depth study on the wide range of information included in CommonName (CN) and Subject Alternative Name (SAN), drawing comparison between client and server certificates, as well as revealing sensitive information.
The DNS HTTPS resource record is a new DNS record type designed for the delivery of configuration information and parameters required to initiate connections to HTTPS network services. In addition, it is a key enabler for TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) by providing the cryptographic keying material needed to encrypt the initial exchange. To understand the adoption of this new DNS HTTPS record, we perform a longitudinal study on the server-side deployment of DNS HTTPS for Tranco top million domains, as well as an analysis of the client-side support for DNS HTTPS through snapshots from major browsers. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first longitudinal study on DNS HTTPS server deployment, and the first known study on client-side support for DNS HTTPS. Despite the rapidly growing trend of DNS HTTPS adoption, our study highlights challenges and concerns in the deployment by both servers and clients, such as the complexity in properly maintaining HTTPS records and connection failure in browsers when the HTTPS record is not properly configured.
People sometimes choose word-like abbreviations to refer to items with a long description. These abbreviations usually come from the descriptive text of the item and are easy to remember and pronounce, while preserving the key idea of the item. Coming up with a nice abbreviation is not an easy job, even for human. Previous assistant naming systems compose names by applying hand-written rules, which may not perform well. In this paper, we propose to view the naming task as an artificial intelligence problem and create a data set in the domain of academic naming. To generate more delicate names, we propose a three-step framework, including description analysis, candidate generation and abbreviation ranking, each of which is parameterized and optimizable. We conduct experiments to compare different settings of our framework with several analysis approaches from different perspectives. Compared to online or baseline systems, our framework could achieve the best results.