![][1] In addition to greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy, analyses must also consider effects on pollution, safety, and traffic congestion. PHOTO: ISTOCK.COM/PLHERRERA Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards for passenger vehicles and light trucks have long been a centerpiece of the U.S. strategy to reduce energy use and GHG emissions and increase energy security. Under the authority of the Energy Independence and Security Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) jointly set GHG and CAFE standards to reach 55 miles per gallon by 2025. A 2016 draft technical assessment report (TAR) affirmed by the EPA in January 2017 concluded that the 2022–2025 standards were technologically feasible and that benefits far exceeded costs. But under the current administration, those agencies are now challenging that conclusion in a 2018 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which proposes freezing standards at model year (MY) 2020 levels through 2025. Its analysis finds that the costs of the previous standards now exceed benefits. With the agencies currently in the process of determining whether the rule should be finalized, we describe how the 2018 analysis has fundamental flaws and inconsistences, is at odds with basic economic theory and empirical studies, is misleading, and does not improve estimates of costs and benefits of fuel economy standards beyond those in the 2016 analysis. A benefit-cost analysis (see table S1) for fuel economy standards grounded on basic economic principles must consider the behavior of consumers and automakers as well as keep account of several externalities ([ 1 ][2]). It must consider a range of parameter values and assumptions to account for inherent uncertainty as well as the impact of related policies that determine the relevant baseline against which the standards are compared. Modeling consumer behavior should include the purchase of general goods and new or used vehicles. Consumers trade off vehicle prices for various vehicle attributes (for example, performance, safety features, seating capacity, and so on). They also decide how much to drive and whether to keep or scrap their older vehicles. A comprehensive analysis would allow automakers to comply with standards by adjusting vehicle prices, improving fuel economy, and altering performance and other vehicle attributes ([ 2 ][3]–[ 5 ][4]). It would also recognize that technology is determined by automaker investments, while accounting for learning-by-doing and knowledge spillovers that, over time, may lower the compliance costs. Modeling of the interaction between new and used vehicle markets is critical to determine the resulting size of the total fleet and its composition, as well as the prices of vehicles (relative to the price of other goods). Prices, fuel economy, and other attributes determine the total cost of ownership, which affects total vehicle miles traveled (VMT), as well as willingness to pay for vehicles ([ 1 ][2], [ 6 ][5]). A comprehensive protocol should also consider costs and benefits that arise from “external effects,” including GHG emissions, energy security, local air pollution, safety, and traffic congestion ([ 7 ][6]), which are affected by fleet size and its composition and the total number of miles driven. In the case of safety, four additional outcomes are relevant: changes in vehicle weights and sizes, distribution of weights and sizes in the entire fleet, distribution of vehicle vintage, and sorting of individuals into vehicles on the basis of their risk preferences, risk profiles, and preferences for other vehicle attributes ([ 8 ][7]–[ 10 ][8]). Valuation parameters are critical for converting impacts into costs and benefits. The value of a statistical life is used to value fatalities, whereas the social cost of carbon is used for valuing the benefits of reduced gasoline use ([ 11 ][9], [ 12 ][10]). Other valuation parameters reflect the value of energy security and the health costs of tailpipe emissions. A comprehensive protocol should also account for other factors, including changes in gasoline prices over time. Both the 2016 and 2018 analyses deviate from the comprehensive protocol outlined above because they do not explicitly model consumer choices and tend to miss important trade-offs between general consumption, vehicle choice, and VMT. On the supply side, the modeling of the new and used car markets does not fully consider important interactions between these markets. As a consequence, multimarket adjustments, and resulting outcomes such as the size of the fleet, fleet composition, and prices of vehicles, are captured imperfectly. Incomplete accounting for such adjustments also affects the magnitudes of the external costs and benefits. The 2018 analysis did attempt to incorporate several channels of adjustment that were missing from the 2016 TAR (see table S1, fourth column). However, the most impactful channels were added in an ad hoc way that runs afoul of the proposed protocol outlined above, existing research, and basic economic principles. As a result, the changes in the 2018 NPRM are misleading. Although we do not endorse the 2016 TAR, the 2018 analysis failed to advance our understanding of the true costs and benefits of fuel economy standards. There are stark differences between the costs and benefits assigned to the 2022–2025 standards in the 2016 and 2018 analyses, reflecting differences in assumptions. The figure shows the costs and benefits from the affirmed 2022–2025 CAFE standards, relative to the proposed rollback levels as calculated by the agencies [see supplementary materials (SM) section G for the GHG emissions standards]. To interpret impacts of a rollback of the standard in the context of the figure, one should change the signs of all costs and benefits. For the CAFE standard, the 2016 review...