Zhongshu Gu

Zhongshu Gu

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Zhongshu Gu

IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 April 2024 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PCPau-Chen Cheng
Pau-Chen Cheng
WOWojciech Ozga
Wojciech Ozga
EVEnriquillo Valdez
Enriquillo Valdez
SASalman Ahmed
Salman Ahmed
ZGZhongshu Gu
Zhongshu Gu
JBJames Bottomley
James Bottomley
Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is an architectural extension in the 4th Generation Intel Xeon Scalable Processor that supports confidential computing. TDX allows the deployment of virtual machines in the Secure-Arbitration Mode (SEAM) with encrypted CPU state and memory, integrity protection, and remote attestation. TDX aims at enforcing hardware-assisted isolation for virtual machines and minimize the attack surface exposed to host platforms, which are considered to be untrustworthy or adversarial in the confidential computing’s new threat model. TDX can be leveraged by regulated industries or sensitive data holders to outsource their computations and data with end-to-end protection in public cloud infrastructures. This article aims at providing a comprehensive understanding of TDX to potential adopters, domain experts, and security researchers looking to leverage the technology for their own purposes. We adopt a top-down approach, starting with high-level security principles and moving to low-level technical details of TDX. Our analysis is based on publicly available documentation and source code, offering insights from security researchers outside of Intel.

5 November 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XGXing Gao
Xing Gao
BSBenjamin Steenkamer
Benjamin Steenkamer
ZGZhongshu Gu
Zhongshu Gu
MKMehmet Kayaalp
Mehmet Kayaalp
DPDimitrios Pendarakis
Dimitrios Pendarakis
HWHaining Wang
Haining Wang
Container technology provides a lightweight operating system level virtual hosting environment. Its emergence profoundly changes the development and deployment paradigms of multi-tier distributed applications. However, due to the incomplete implementation of system resource isolation mechanisms in the Linux kernel, some security concerns still exist for multiple containers sharing an operating system kernel on a multi-tenancy container-based cloud service. In this paper, we first present the information leakage channels we discovered that are accessible within containers. Such channels expose a spectrum of system-wide host information to containers without proper resource partitioning. By exploiting such leaked host information, it becomes much easier for malicious adversaries (acting as tenants in a container cloud) to launch attacks that might impact the reliability of cloud services. We demonstrate that the information leakage channels could be exploited to infer private data, detect and verify co-residence, build covert channels, and launch more advanced cloud-based attacks. We discuss the root causes of the containers information leakage and propose a two-stage defense approach. As demonstrated in the evaluation, our defense is effective and incurs trivial performance overhead.

1 June 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZGZhongshu Gu
Zhongshu Gu
HJHani Jamjoom
Hani Jamjoom
DSDong Su
Dong Su
HHHeqing Huang
Heqing Huang
JZJialong Zhang
Jialong Zhang
IMIan Molloy
Ian Molloy
Distributed collaborative learning (DCL) paradigms enable building joint machine learning models from distrusted multi-party participants. Data confidentiality is guaranteed by retaining private training data on each participant's local infrastructure. However, this approach makes today's DCL design fundamentally vulnerable to data poisoning and backdoor attacks. It limits DCL's model accountability, which is key to backtracking problematic training data instances and their responsible contributors. In this paper, we introduce CALTRAIN, a centralized collaborative learning system that simultaneously achieves data confidentiality and model accountability. CALTRAIN enforces isolated computation via secure enclaves on centrally aggregated training data to guarantee data confidentiality. To support building accountable learning models, we securely maintain the links between training instances and their contributors. Our evaluation shows that the models generated by CALTRAIN can achieve the same prediction accuracy when compared to the models trained in non-protected environments. We also demonstrate that when malicious training participants tend to implant backdoors during model training, CALTRAIN can accurately and precisely discover the poisoned or mislabeled training data that lead to the runtime mispredictions.

22 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PCPau-Chen Cheng
Pau-Chen Cheng
KEKevin Eykholt
Kevin Eykholt
ZGZhongshu Gu
Zhongshu Gu
HJHani Jamjoom
Hani Jamjoom
KJK. R. Jayaram
K. R. Jayaram
AVAshish Verma
Ashish Verma

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
EVEnriquillo Valdez
Enriquillo Valdez
SASalman Ahmed
Salman Ahmed
ZGZhongshu Gu
Zhongshu Gu
CDChristophe de Dinechin
Christophe de Dinechin
PCPau-Chen Cheng
Pau-Chen Cheng
HJHani Jamjoom
Hani Jamjoom
The Confidential Containers (CoCo) project, as an open-source community initiative, inherits the system architecture of Kata Containers while integrating confidential computing to protect cloud-native container workloads. However, there exists a misalignment in the threat model and trusted computing base (TCB) between Kata Containers and confidential computing. The shifted trust boundaries could potentially expose a range of vulnerabilities, particularly in scenarios where a malicious actor on the host gains access to the CoCo's unprotected control interface. This paper conducts a thorough examination of CoCo's system architecture, exploring the attack surface resulting from the discord in trust boundaries. We have assessed all API endpoints of CoCo's control interface, categorizing them based on their security properties. Drawing from these insights, we have developed a bifurcation approach to splitting CoCo's control interface. This involves establishing an owner-side controller and minimizing the capabilities of the existing host-side controller. Under this framework, the host-side controller is exclusively responsible for allocating and recycling compute resources, while dedicated workload owners can directly manage their containers through alternative secure tunnels. This approach ensures seamless integration with cloud-native orchestration layers and aligns CoCo with the threat model of confidential computing. By doing so, it effectively prevents untrusted hosts from accessing confidential data and interfering with the execution of workloads within protected domains.

19 November 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SZShixuan Zhao
Shixuan Zhao
ZGZhongshu Gu
Zhongshu Gu
SASalman Ahmed
Salman Ahmed
EVEnriquillo Valdez
Enriquillo Valdez
HJHani Jamjoom
Hani Jamjoom
ZLZhiqiang Lin
Zhiqiang Lin