1 August 2023 in PsyArXiv
The idea that human cognition is, or can be understood as, a form of computation is a useful conceptual tool for cognitive science. It was a foundational assumption during the birth of cognitive science as a multidisciplinary field, with Artificial Intelligence (AI) as one of its contributing fields. One conception of AI in this context is as a provider of computational tools (frameworks, concepts, formalisms, models, proofs, simulations, etc.) that support theory building in cognitive science. The contemporary field of AI, however, has taken the theoretical possibility of explaining human cognition as a form of computation to imply the practical feasibility of realising human(-like or -level) cognition in factual computational systems; and, the field frames this realisation as a short-term inevitability. Yet, as we formally prove herein, creating systems with human(-like or -level) cognition is intrinsically computationally intractable. This means that any factual AI systems created in the short-run are at best decoys. When we think these systems capture something deep about ourselves and our thinking, we induce distorted and impoverished images of ourselves and our cognition. In other words, AI in current practice is deteriorating our theoretical understanding of cognition rather than advancing and enhancing it. The situation could be remediated by releasing the grip of the currently dominant view on AI and by returning to the idea of AI as a theoretical tool for cognitive science. In reclaiming this older idea of AI, however, it is important not to repeat conceptual mistakes of the past (and present) that brought us to where we are today.
1 April 2016 in Journal of Theoretical Biology
23 April 2021 in PsyArXiv
This is a preprint version of a published paper. Please cite as: Rich, P., de Haan, R., Wareham, T., & van Rooij, I. (2021). How hard is cognitive science? Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 43. Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8cr8x1c4
22 December 2016 in Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics
One important purpose of rationality research is to help individuals improve. There are two main approaches to the task of rendering evaluations of rationality that support guidance: the axiomatic approach evaluates the coherence of behavior according to axiomatic criteria, while ecological rationality evaluates processes according to their expected per- formance. The first part of the paper considers arguments against the axiomatic and ecological approaches and concludes that neither approach is unserviceable; in particular, each has the flexibility to accept important insights from the other. The second part of the paper characterizes each approach according to the profile of costs and benefits that it accepts, and shows that combining the two approaches in a particular way yields a new approach with a superior cost-benefit profile. This 'hybrid approach' uses axiomatic rationality criteria to evaluate processes that agents might use.
7 November 2014 in Synthese
6 October 2020 in Theory and Decision