Alexander Schröder

Alexander Schröder

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Alexander Schröder

Social Neuroscience Lab, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
14 November 2022 in Communications Biology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LMLaura Müller-Pinzler
Laura Müller-Pinzler
NCNora Czekalla
Nora Czekalla
AMAnnalina V. Mayer
Annalina V. Mayer
ASAlexander Schröder
Alexander Schröder
DSDavid S. Stolz
David S. Stolz
SKSören Krach
Sören Krach
The feedback people receive on their behavior shapes the process of belief formation and self-efficacy in mastering a particular task. However, the neural and computational mechanisms of how the subjective value of self-efficacy beliefs, and the corresponding affect, influence the learning process remain unclear. We investigated these mechanisms during self-efficacy belief formation using fMRI, pupillometry, and computational modeling, and by analyzing individual differences in affective experience. Biases in the formation of self-efficacy beliefs were associated with affect, pupil dilation, and neural activity within the anterior insula, amygdala, ventral tegmental area/ substantia nigra, and mPFC. Specifically, neural and pupil responses mapped the valence of the prediction errors in correspondence with individuals’ experienced affective states and learning biases during self-efficacy belief formation. Together with the functional connectivity dynamics of the anterior insula within this network, our results provide evidence for neural and computational mechanisms of how we arrive at affected beliefs.

9 May 2024 in bioRxiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
NCNora Czekalla
Nora Czekalla
ASAlexander Schröder
Alexander Schröder
AMAnalina Mayer
Analina Mayer
JSJanine Stierand
Janine Stierand
DSDavid S Stolz
David S Stolz
LMLaura Müller-Pinzler
Laura Müller-Pinzler
Maladaptive self-beliefs are a core symptom of major depressive disorder. These beliefs are perpetuated by a negatively biased integration of self-related feedback. Understanding the neurocomputational mechanisms of biased belief updating may help to counteract maladaptive beliefs and the maintenance of depression. The present study uses a belief-updating task and functional neuroimaging to examine the neurocomputational mechanisms associated with self-related feedback processing in individuals with major depression and matched healthy controls. We hypothesized that increased symptom burden in depression is associated with negatively biased self-belief updating and altered neural tracking of social feedback. Our findings show that depression is related to reduced incorporation of unexpected positive feedback, with higher symptom burden alongside heightened insula reactivity to unexpected negative feedback. The interplay of increased neural responsiveness to negative feedback and the reduced learning from positive feedback provide new insights into cognitive distortions in depression and may explain the persistence of maladaptive self-beliefs and, thus, the maintenance of depression.

29 October 2025 in Open Mind
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ASAlexander Schröder
Alexander Schröder
NCNora Czekalla
Nora Czekalla
AMAnalina Mayer
Analina Mayer
LZLei Zhang
Lei Zhang
DSDavid S. Stolz
David S. Stolz
SKSören Krach
Sören Krach
Human self-beliefs hinge on social feedback, but their formation and revision are not solely based on new information. Biases during learning, such as confirming initial expectations, can lead to inaccurate beliefs. This study uses computational modeling to explore how initial expectations about one’s own and others’ abilities and confidence in these beliefs affect processes of belief formation and belief revision in novel behavioral domains. In the first session, participants formed performance beliefs through trial-by-trial feedback. In the second session, feedback contingencies were reversed to promote a revision of beliefs. Results showed that people form and revise beliefs in a confirmatory manner, with lower initial expectations being linked to more negatively biased belief formation and revision, while growing confidence strengthened these beliefs over time. Once formed, these beliefs proved resistant to change even when faced with contradictory feedback. The findings suggest that newly formed beliefs become entrenched and resistant to new, contradictory information in a short period of time. Understanding how self-beliefs are formed, the role that confidence plays in this process, and why established beliefs are difficult to revise can inform the development of interventions aimed at promoting more adaptive learning in educational, clinical, and social contexts.

30 August 2024 in bioRxiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
ASAlexander Schröder
Alexander Schröder
NCNora Czekalla
Nora Czekalla
AMAnalina Mayer
Analina Mayer
LZLei Zhang
Lei Zhang
DSDavid S Stolz
David S Stolz
SKSören Krach
Sören Krach
Self-beliefs hinge on social feedback, but their formation and revision are not solely based on new information. Biases, such as confirming initial expectations, can lead to inaccurate self-beliefs. This study uses computational modeling to explore how initial expectations and confidence affect self-belief formation and revision in novel behavioral domains. In the first session, participants developed performance self-beliefs through trial-by-trial feedback. In the second session, feedback contingencies were reversed, requiring belief revision for accurate self-beliefs. Results showed a confirmation bias in belief updating, with initial expectations being linked to biased learning during both formation and revision. Higher confidence was associated with reduced belief revision and on average, self-beliefs persisted despite the conflicting evidence. This study extends the literature on confirmation bias to learning in uncharged, novel behavioral domains. Further, it demonstrates the importance of initial expectations and associated confidence for biased self-belief formation and subsequent learning.

6 August 2026 in Translational Psychiatry
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
NCNora Czekalla
Nora Czekalla
ASAlexander Schröder
Alexander Schröder
AMAnalina Mayer
Analina Mayer
JSJanine Stierand
Janine Stierand
DSDavid S. Stolz
David S. Stolz
LMLaura Müller-Pinzler
Laura Müller-Pinzler
Background: Maladaptive self-beliefs are a core symptom of major depressive disorder. These beliefs are perpetuated by a negatively biased integration of self-related feedback. Understanding the neurocomputational mechanisms of biased belief updating may help to counteract maladaptive beliefs and the maintenance of depression. Methods: The present study uses a belief-updating task and functional neuroimaging to examine the neurocomputational mechanisms associated with self-related feedback processing in individuals with major depression ( n = 35) and matched healthy controls ( n = 32). We hypothesized that increased symptom burden in depression is associated with negatively biased self-belief updating and altered hemodynamic responses to social feedback. Results: Our findings show that, in the clinical sample, the incorporation of unexpected positive feedback was reduced with greater symptom burden, and that insula reactivity was generally elevated to unexpected negative feedback. Conclusion: The interplay of increased hemodynamic responsiveness to negative feedback and the reduced learning from positive feedback provide new insights into cognitive distortions in depression and may explain the persistence of maladaptive self-beliefs and, thus, the maintenance of depression.

9 December 2024 in bioRxiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
AMAnalina Mayer
Analina Mayer
ASAlexander Schröder
Alexander Schröder
NCNora Czekalla
Nora Czekalla
LMLaura Müller-Pinzler
Laura Müller-Pinzler
LRLaura Rosenbusch
Laura Rosenbusch
SKSören Krach
Sören Krach
Time of day influences a variety of human cognitive processes, including attention, executive functions and memory formation, as well as affective experiences and mood. However, circadian modulations of self-related learning and belief formation, which are highly affected by emotional states, remain poorly understood. Here, we present results from exploratory post-hoc analyses on data aggregated from five studies assessing the formation of self-related ability beliefs. A total of N =242 healthy participants completed a validated learning task at different times of the day, during which they continuously received feedback on their performance. Computational modeling was applied to quantify participants’ learning behavior during the task. Results suggest an association between time-of-day and self-belief formation, showing that participants who were tested in the evening (7:00-9:59 p.m.) updated their self-beliefs more strongly in response to the received feedback compared to those tested in the afternoon (1:00-3:59 p.m.). Evidence from additional models indicated that these differences were driven by non-linear, rhythmic changes in self-belief formation across different times of the day. Future studies should systematically examine within-subject fluctuations in self-belief formation across the day and address the influence of individual factors such as chronotype, age, mood and sleep quality. Understanding circadian modulations of self-related belief formation could contribute to optimized interventions for conditions characterized by maladaptive self-beliefs, such as depression, as well as in academic contexts.