Martha I. Nelson

Martha I. Nelson

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Martha I. Nelson

Division of Intramural Research, National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 September 2024 in Nature
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Journal Article
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TPThomas Peacock
Thomas Peacock
LMLouise Moncla
Louise Moncla
GDGytis Dudas
Gytis Dudas
DVDavid VanInsberghe
David VanInsberghe
KSKsenia Sukhova
Ksenia Sukhova
MNMartha I. Nelson
Martha I. Nelson
Influenza A viruses (IAV) have caused more documented global pandemics in human history than any other pathogen1,2. High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses belonging to the H5N1 subtype are a leading pandemic risk. Two decades after H5N1 “bird flu” became established in poultry in Southeast Asia, its descendants have resurged3, setting off an H5N1 panzootic in wild birds that is fueled by (a) rapid intercontinental spread, reaching South America and Antarctica for the first time4,5; (b) fast evolution via genomic reassortment6; and (c) frequent spillover into terrestrial7,8 and marine mammals9. The virus has sustained mammal-to-mammal transmission in multiple settings, including European fur farms10,11, South American marine mammals12–15, and US dairy cattle16–19, raising questions about whether humans are next. Historically, swine are considered optimal intermediary hosts that help avian influenza viruses (AIV) adapt to mammals before jumping to humans20. However, the altered ecology of H5N1 has opened the door to new evolutionary pathways. Could dairy cattle, farmed mink, or South American sea lions serve as new mammalian gateways to humans? Here we explore the molecular and ecological factors driving H5N1’s sudden expansion in host range and assess the likelihood of different zoonotic pathways leading to an H5N1 pandemic.

7 September 2023 in Nature Communications
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MLMariana Leguia
Mariana Leguia
AGAlejandra Garcia-Glaessner
Alejandra Garcia-Glaessner
BMBreno Muñoz-Saavedra
Breno Muñoz-Saavedra
DJDiana Juarez
Diana Juarez
PBPatricia Barrera
Patricia Barrera
JLJesus Lescano
Jesus Lescano
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A/H5N1 viruses (lineage 2.3.4.4b) are rapidly invading the Americas, threatening wildlife, poultry, and potentially evolving into the next global pandemic. In November 2022 HPAI arrived in Peru, triggering massive pelican and sea lion die-offs. We report genomic characterization of HPAI/H5N1 in five species of marine mammals and seabirds (dolphins, sea lions, sanderlings, pelicans and cormorants). Peruvian viruses belong to lineage 2.3.4.4b, but they are 4:4 reassortants where 4 genomic segments (PA, HA, NA and MP) position within the Eurasian lineage that initially entered North America from Eurasia, while the other 4 genomic segments (PB2, PB1, NP and NS) position within the American lineage (clade C) that circulated in North America. These viruses are rapidly accruing mutations, including mutations of concern, that warrant further examination and highlight an urgent need for active local surveillance to manage outbreaks and limit spillover into other species, including humans.

23 December 2021 in Nature
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VHVanessa L. Hale
Vanessa L. Hale
PDPatricia M. Dennis
Patricia M. Dennis
DMDillon McBride
Dillon McBride
JNJacqueline Nolting
Jacqueline Nolting
CMChristopher Madden
Christopher Madden
ABAndrew Bowman
Andrew Bowman

30 October 2020 in Science
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MWMichael Worobey
Michael Worobey
JPJonathan Pekar
Jonathan Pekar
BLBrendan B. Larsen
Brendan B. Larsen
MNMartha I. Nelson
Martha I. Nelson
VHVerity Hill
Verity Hill
PLPhilippe Lemey
Philippe Lemey
A series of unfortunate events: The history of how severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) spread around the planet has been far from clear. Several narratives have been propagated by social media and, in some cases, national policies were forged in response. Now that many thousands of virus sequences are available, two studies analyzed some of the key early events in the spread of SARS-CoV-2. Bedford et al. found that the virus arrived in Washington state in late January or early February. The viral genome from the first case detected had mutations similar to those found in Chinese samples and rapidly spread and dominated subsequent undetected community transmission. The other viruses detected had origins in Europe. Worobey et al. found that early introductions into Germany and the west coast of the United States were extinguished by vigorous public health efforts, but these successes were largely unrecognized. Unfortunately, several major travel events occurred in February, including repatriations from China, with lax public health follow-up. Serial, independent introductions triggered the major outbreaks in the United States and Europe that still hold us in the grip of control measures. Science , this issue p. 571 , p. 564

1 March 2015 in Trends in Microbiology
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MNMartha I. Nelson
Martha I. Nelson
AVAmy L. Vincent
Amy L. Vincent

1 October 2012 in Journal of General Virology
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Journal Article
Open access
MNMartha I. Nelson
Martha I. Nelson
MGMarie R. Gramer
Marie R. Gramer
AVAmy L. Vincent
Amy L. Vincent
EHEdward Holmes
Edward Holmes
To determine the extent to which influenza viruses jump between human and swine hosts, we undertook a large-scale phylogenetic analysis of pandemic A/H1N1/09 (H1N1pdm09) influenza virus genome sequence data. From this, we identified at least 49 human-to-swine transmission events that occurred globally during 2009–2011, thereby highlighting the ability of the H1N1pdm09 virus to transmit repeatedly from humans to swine, even following adaptive evolution in humans. Similarly, we identified at least 23 separate introductions of human seasonal (non-pandemic) H1 and H3 influenza viruses into swine globally since 1990. Overall, these results reveal the frequency with which swine are exposed to human influenza viruses, indicate that humans make a substantial contribution to the genetic diversity of influenza viruses in swine, and emphasize the need to improve biosecurity measures at the human–swine interface, including influenza vaccination of swine workers.