Miriam Franchella

Miriam Franchella

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Miriam Franchella

Università degli Studi

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

30Years (1997-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 January 1997 in Archive for History of Exact Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
MFMiriam Franchella
Miriam Franchella

2 January 2020 in Journal of Cognitive Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LMLaura Macchi
Laura Macchi
LCLAURA CARAVONA
LAURA CARAVONA
FPFrancesco Poli
Francesco Poli
MBMaria Bagassi
Maria Bagassi
MFMiriam A. G. Franchella
Miriam A. G. Franchella
The "Wason selection task" is still one of the most studied tasks in cognitive psychology. We argue that the low performance originally obtained seems to be caused by how the information of the task is presented. By systematically manipulating the task instructions, making explicit the information that participants are required to infer in accordance with the logical interpretation of the material implication "if, then", we found an improvement in performance. In Experiment 1, the conditional rule has been formulated within a relevant context and in accordance with the conversational rules of communication, hence transmitting the actual meaning of the material implication. In Experiment 2, a similar improvement has been obtained even without the realistic scenario, only by making explicit the unidirectionality of the material implication. We conclude that task instructions are often formulate neglecting the conversational rules of communication, and this greatly reduces the possibility to succeed in the task.

20 August 2018 in History and Philosophy of Logic
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MFMiriam Franchella
Miriam Franchella
The use of the three labels (logicism, formalism, intuitionism) to denote the three foundational schools of the early twentieth century are now part of literature. Yet, neither their number nor their adoption has been stable over the twentieth century. They were not introduced by the founding fathers of each school: namely, neither Frege nor Russell spoke of ‘logicism’; and even Hilbert did not use the word ‘formalism’ to introduce his foundational programs. At a certain point, only Brouwer used the label ‘intuitionism’ in his scientific production to personify his philosophy of mathematics and he used the label ‘formalism’ for Hilbert’s foundational viewpoint. Starting with Brouwer, the origin of the use of the three labels to represent a foundational meaning, will be analysed in this paper. Thereafter, the role that Brouwer’s pupil Arend Heyting had in the production and use of foundational labels will be considered. On the basis of the comparison of the attitudes of these two scholars I will finally advance the thesis that not only the creation but also the use of labels, far from being a mere gesture of academic reference to literature, can be a sign of the cultural operation each scholar wanted to do.

1 March 2000 in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MFMiriam Franchella
Miriam Franchella
Julius König is famous for his mistaken attempt to demonstrate that the continuum hypothesis was false. It is also known that the only positive result that could have survived from his proof is the paradox which bears his name. Less famous is his 1914 bookNeue Grundlagen der Logik, Arithmetik und Mengenlehre. Still, it contains original contributions to logic, like the concept of metatheory and the solution of paradoxes based on the refusal of the law of bivalence. We are going to discover them by analysing the content of the book.

2 October 2015 in History and Philosophy of Logic
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MFMiriam Franchella
Miriam Franchella
Friedrich Nietzsche and Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer had strong personalities and freely expressed unconventional opinions. In particular, they dared to challenge the traditional view that considered Aristotelian logic as being absolute and intrinsic to man. Although they formed this opinion in different ways and in different contexts (Nietzsche was born in Saxony and lived in the second half of the nineteenth century, beginning his career as a classical philologist before turning to philosophy; Brouwer was a Dutch mathematician who lived from 1881 to 1966), they both based it on a view of life that considered it as a struggle for power in which logic was a weapon. Therefore, it is interesting to carry out an in-depth analysis on the origins, the core of their opinions concerning logic and the consequences. As a matter of fact, a detailed analysis and a comparison of their contributions to the philosophy of logic have not yet been carried out. In this paper, I intend to present the results of my research on this subject performed by taking into account the studies conducted by E. Steinhart, O. Schutte and S.D. Hales.

6 April 2022 in Philosophia
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MFMiriam Franchella
Miriam Franchella
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many mathematicians referred to intuition as the indispensable research tool for obtaining new results. In this essay we will analyse a group of mathematicians (Felix Klein, Henri Poincaré, Ludwig Bieberbach, Arend Heyting) who interacted with Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer (the father of the intuitionist foundational school) in order to compare their conceptions of intuition. We will see how to the same word “intuition” (in GermanAnschauung) very different meanings corresponded: they varied from geometrical vision, to a unitary view of a demonstration, to the perception of time, to the faculty (shared by everybody) of considering concepts that habitually occur in our thinking separately. Furthermore, we will discover that these different meanings had a philosophical, very relevant counterside: they passed from a racial characterization of mathematics to a pluralistic view of it.