Robyn Langdon

Robyn Langdon

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Robyn Langdon

ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

30Years (1997-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2001 in Psychological Review
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Journal Article
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MCMax Coltheart
Max Coltheart
KRKathleen Rastle
Kathleen Rastle
CPConrad Perry
Conrad Perry
RLRobyn Langdon
Robyn Langdon
JZJohannes Ziegler
Johannes Ziegler
This article describes the Dual Route Cascaded (DRC) model, a computational model of visual word recognition and reading aloud. The DRC is a computational realization of the dual-route theory of reading, and is the only computational model of reading that can perform the 2 tasks most commonly used to study reading: lexical decision and reading aloud. For both tasks, the authors show that a wide variety of variables that influence human latencies influence the DRC model's latencies in exactly the same way. The DRC model simulates a number of such effects that other computational models of reading do not, but there appear to be no effects that any other current computational model of reading can simulate but that the DRC model cannot. The authors conclude that the DRC model is the most successful of the existing computational models of reading.

10 January 2011 in Annual Review of Psychology
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Journal Article
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MCMax Coltheart
Max Coltheart
RLRobyn Langdon
Robyn Langdon
RMRyan McKay
Ryan McKay
Delusional beliefs are seen in association with a number of neuropathological conditions, including schizophrenia, dementia, and traumatic brain injury. A key distinction exists between polythematic delusion (here the patient exhibits delusional beliefs about a variety of topics that are unrelated to each other) and monothematic delusion (here the patient exhibits just a single delusional belief or else a small set of delusional beliefs that are all related to a single theme). A great deal of recent research has focused on identifying and investigating various different forms of monothematic delusion. We discuss a general theoretical approach to the understanding of monothematic delusions—a two-factor approach according to which understanding the nature and genesis of any kind of monothematic delusion involves seeking answers to two questions. The first question is, what brought the delusional idea to mind in the first place? The second question is, why is this idea accepted as true and adopted as a belief when the belief is typically bizarre and when so much evidence against its truth is available to the patient? We discuss in detail six different kinds of monothematic delusion, showing for each how neuropsychological considerations allow a first factor (responsible for the content of the belief) and a second factor (responsible for the failure to reject the belief) to be plausibly identified. Five difficulties confronting this two-factor account of monothematic delusion are then identified, and attempts are made to address each one.

1 June 2001 in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
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MDMartin Davies
Martin Davies
MCMax Coltheart
Max Coltheart
RLRobyn Langdon
Robyn Langdon
NBNora Breen
Nora Breen
We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher's view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the etiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows, but we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor.

21 October 2002 in Psychological Medicine
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Journal Article
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RLR. Langdon
R. Langdon
MCM. Coltheart
M. Coltheart
PWP. B. Ward
P. B. Ward
SCS. V. Catts
S. V. Catts
Background. Disturbed speech in schizophrenia may reflect pragmatic deficits of expressive language. Pragmatic comprehension deficits also occur in schizophrenia. This study investigated whether poor ‘mind-reading’ (i.e. a general difficulty with inferring and monitoring other people's thoughts) causes pragmatic language impairments of both expression and comprehension in patients with schizophrenia.Method. Mind-reading (or theory of mind) was tested in patients with schizophrenia and in healthy controls using a false-belief picture-sequencing task. Pragmatic comprehension skills were assessed using a test of non-literal speech interpretation. Clinical ratings of formal thought disorder (FTD) indexed the expressive language deficits of patients. To control for possible contributory effects of executive dysfunction, inhibitory control was tested using capture picture-sequences and executive-planning was tested using the Tower of London task.Results. False-belief picture-sequencing, understanding of irony and understanding of metaphors were all selectively impaired in the patients. Poor mind-reading (indexed by high error rate in sequencing false-belief stories) was associated with poor understanding of irony, but was unrelated to poor understanding of metaphors. Whereas poor appreciation of irony and poor mind-reading were associated with high ratings of positive formal thought disorder, high ratings of negative formal thought disorder were associated with poor understanding of metaphors and executive dysfunction.Conclusions. Whereas poor mind-reading may contribute to positive aspects of formal thought disorder and impaired appreciation of irony in patients with schizophrenia; negative features of formal thought disorder and poor understanding of metaphors appear better explained by abnormal semantics. Overall, the findings of this study support the view that the functional basis of formal thought disorder in schizophrenia is not unitary.

1 May 1999 in Cognition
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Journal Article
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RLRobyn Langdon
Robyn Langdon
MCMax Coltheart
Max Coltheart

1 January 2007 in Neuropsychologia
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MPMelanie Porter
Melanie Porter
MCMax Coltheart
Max Coltheart
RLRobyn Langdon
Robyn Langdon