Three studies explore mental processes underlying spontaneous trait inferences about self-informants and the spontaneous trait transference characterizing third-party informants. Process differences are suggested in that instructions prompting a nontrait inference (truth or lie?) reduce self-informant trait-savings effects and lower self-informant trait judgments. For third-party informants, such instructions have no effect on these outcome variables. Results of a third study are inconsistent with cognitive load as an explanation for these effects. Taken together, these results indicate that inferences, and not merely associations, spontaneously form when processing information about self-informants. The results also show that the inferences and judgments that occur in spontaneous trait transference are not caused by the misidentification of third-party informants as self-informants.
21 October 2010 in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
In two studies people judged the order in which two real-world events occurred. Ordering performance was better for events that were recent or widely separated in time. Ordering performance was also consistently related to predicted event memorability and to the amount of processing given to an event during encoding. Ordering performance was not consistently related to the person-typicality, pleasantness, or emotional intensity of the events, and was also not related to whether the two events judged came from the same thematic category. These results suggest that memory for event order is not entirely reconstructed from event content. We suggest that the self-concept may sometimes serve as an implicit timekeeper in autobiographical memory.
1 September 2007 in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
We revisit the thesis we first offered in 1997, namely, that the human capacity called “the self” is the product of evolutionary pressures. A review of the literature accumulated in the 20 years prompted three changes to the original thesis. First, we expanded our 1997 conception of the self. We argue that the self consists of a multiplicity of cognitions, each of which may reflect the action of a different neural system. Second, we revised the timeline for the evolution of the human self. At least some components of the human self were present in hominids earlier than the 100,000 years-old date that we speculated served as the oldest-age boundary for the emergence of the self. Third, we supplemented the evidentiary basis by relying on advances in brain structure, brain function, and the genetic underpinnings of the brain. In comparison to the state of knowledge in 1997, there is more reason to assert in 2017 that humans have the capacity to experience a self because this trait was selected via evolution.