Shiyang Yu

Shiyang Yu

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Shiyang Yu

College of Philosophy, Nankai University, Tianjin, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 March 2020 in Argumentation
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SYShiyang Yu
Shiyang Yu
FZFrank Zenker
Frank Zenker
According to the argument scheme approach, to evaluate a given scheme-saturating instance completely does entail asking all critical questions (CQs) relevant to it. Although this is a central task for argumentation theorists, the field currently lacks a method for providing a complete argument evaluation. Approaching this task at the meta-level, we combine a logical with a substantive approach to the argument schemes by starting from Toulmin’s schema: ‘data, warrant, so claim’. For the yet more general schema: ‘premise(s); if premise(s), then conclusion; so conclusion’, we forward a meta-level CQ-list that is arguably both complete and applicable. This list should inform ongoing theoretical efforts at generating appropriate object-level CQs for specific argument schemes.

29 November 2017 in Argumentation
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SYShiyang Yu
Shiyang Yu
FZFrank Zenker
Frank Zenker
Whether abduction is treated as an argument or as an inference, the mainstream view presupposes a tight connection between abduction and inference to the best explanation (IBE). This paper critically evaluates this link and supports a narrower view on abduction. Our main thesis is that merely the hypothesis-generative aspect, but not the evaluative aspect, is properly abductive in the sense introduced by C. S. Peirce. We show why equating abduction with IBE (or understanding them as inseparable parts) unnecessarily complicates argument evaluation by levelling the status of abduction as a third reasoning mode (besides deduction and induction). We also propose a scheme for abductive argument along with critical questions, and suggest retaining abduction alongside IBE as related but distinct categories.

30 September 2022 in Argumentation
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FZFrank Zenker
Frank Zenker
SYShiyang Yu
Shiyang Yu


15 March 2019 in Informal Logic
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SYShiyang Yu
Shiyang Yu
FZFrank Zenker
Frank Zenker
When Carl Wellman (1971) introduced the reasoning-type conduction, he endorsed a dialectical view on natural language argumentation. Contemporary scholarship, by contrast, treats conductive argument predominantly on a product view. Not only did Wellman’s reasons for a dialectical view thus fall into disregard; a product-treatment of conduction also flouts the standard semantics of ‘argument’. Attempting to resolve these difficulties, our paper traces Wellman’s preference for a dialectical view to the role of defeasible warrants. These act as stand-ins for (parts of) value hierarchies that arguers of normal suasory inclination find acceptable. We also improve on extant ways of diagramming conduction and distinguish two of its structural variants.

19 March 2026 in Informal Logic
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SYShiyang Yu
Shiyang Yu
While appeals to emotion have traditionally been dismissed as fallacious, recent scholarship has highlighted their potential reasonableness. Yet the role of emotion in these appeals remains underexplored. To address this, under the constraint that appeals to emotion are conceived as premises-conclusion complexes, this paper develops an analytical framework featuring two distinct paths linking premises to the conclusion: a logical path and an emotional path. This framework shows that evaluating such appeals involves first assessing each path individually and then integrating them. Notably, different emotions may either reinforce one another or work in opposition. An agent commits the fallacy of appeal to emotion if they mistakenly perceive the conclusion to be justified when it is not. Drawing on this model, I offer two explanations for how strong emotions can lead to such a misperception. Finally, I examine how the emotional mode can influence the strength of an appeal to emotion, thereby illustrating the epistemological role of emotion in argumentation, as discussed by Howes and Hundleby (2018).