Markus Wurzenberger

Markus Wurzenberger

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Markus Wurzenberger

Digital Safety and Security, Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, Wien, Austria

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 July 2024 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MLMax Landauer
Max Landauer
FSFlorian Skopik
Florian Skopik
MWMarkus Wurzenberger
Markus Wurzenberger
Log data store event execution patterns that correspond to underlying workflows of systems or applications. While most logs are informative, log data also include artifacts that indicate failures or incidents. Accordingly, log data are often used to evaluate anomaly detection techniques that aim to automatically disclose unexpected or otherwise relevant system behavior patterns. Recently, detection approaches leveraging deep learning have increasingly focused on anomalies that manifest as changes of sequential patterns within otherwise normal event traces. Several publicly available data sets, such as HDFS, BGL, Thunderbird, OpenStack, and Hadoop, have since become standards for evaluating these anomaly detection techniques, however, the appropriateness of these data sets has not been closely investigated in the past. In this paper we therefore analyze six publicly available log data sets with focus on the manifestations of anomalies and simple techniques for their detection. Our findings suggest that most anomalies are not directly related to sequential manifestations and that advanced detection techniques are not required to achieve high detection rates on these data sets.

25 August 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MLMax Landauer
Max Landauer
FSFlorian Skopik
Florian Skopik
MFMaximilian Frank
Maximilian Frank
WHWolfgang Hotwagner
Wolfgang Hotwagner
MWMarkus Wurzenberger
Markus Wurzenberger
ARAndreas Rauber
Andreas Rauber
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) monitor system logs and network traffic to recognize malicious activities in computer networks. Evaluating and comparing IDSs with respect to their detection accuracies is thereby essential for their selection in specific use-cases. Despite a great need, hardly any labeled intrusion detection datasets are publicly available. As a consequence, evaluations are often carried out on datasets from real infrastructures, where analysts cannot control system parameters or generate a reliable ground truth, or private datasets that prevent reproducibility of results. As a solution, we present a collection of maintainable log datasets collected in a testbed representing a small enterprise. Thereby, we employ extensive state machines to simulate normal user behavior and inject a multi-step attack. For scalable testbed deployment, we use concepts from model-driven engineering that enable automatic generation and labeling of an arbitrary number of datasets that comprise repetitions of attack executions with variations of parameters. In total, we provide 8 datasets containing 20 distinct types of log files, of which we label 8 files for 10 unique attack steps. We publish the labeled log datasets and code for testbed setup and simulation online as open-source to enable others to reproduce and extend our results.

17 November 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Reliability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MLMax Landauer
Max Landauer
FSFlorian Skopik
Florian Skopik
MWMarkus Wurzenberger
Markus Wurzenberger
WHWolfgang Hotwagner
Wolfgang Hotwagner
Andreas RauberAndreas Rauber
Andreas Rauber
Evaluations of intrusion detection systems (IDS) require log datasets collected in realistic system environments. Existing testbeds therefore offer user simulations and attack scenarios that target specific use-cases. However, not only does the preparation of such testbeds require domain knowledge and time-consuming work, but also maintenance and modifications for other use-cases involve high manual efforts and repeated execution of tasks. In this article, we therefore propose to generate testbeds for IDS evaluation using strategies from model-driven engineering. In particular, our approach models system infrastructure, simulated normal behavior, and attack scenarios as testbed-independent modules. A transformation engine then automatically generates arbitrary numbers of testbeds, each with a particular set of characteristics and capable of running in parallel. Our approach greatly improves configurability and flexibility of testbeds and allows to reuse components across multiple scenarios. We use our proof-of-concept implementation to generate a labeled dataset for IDS evaluation that is published with this article.

4 December 2023 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MWMarkus Wurzenberger
Markus Wurzenberger
GHGeorg Höld
Georg Höld
MLMax Landauer
Max Landauer
FSFlorian Skopik
Florian Skopik

8 August 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
FSFlorian Skopik
Florian Skopik
MWMarkus Wurzenberger
Markus Wurzenberger
GHGeorg Höld
Georg Höld
MLMax Landauer
Max Landauer
WKWalter Kuhn
Walter Kuhn
Behavior-based anomaly detection (AD) approaches for enterprise-IT security are not easily applicable to other domains, such as embedded devices and IoT nodes in cyber-physical systems. AD approaches are usually highly optimized for specific purposes, tightly bound to domain-specific technologies and rely on a specific syntax of investigated data. Data from cyber-physical systems is however highly diverse, often poorly documented and not easily ingested for automated analysis. AECID provides an anomaly detection approach, that monitors unstructured textual event data (i.e., log data), and implements self-learning for autonomous operation. A parser generator establishes a model of normal system behavior on top of observed events, which then can be leveraged to detect anomalies as deviations from that baseline. The unsupervised anomaly detection approaches of AECID apply machine learning techniques to perform sequence analysis, correlation analysis and statistical tests of events represented in log data. This paper discusses AECID's applicability in a building security system use case. A proof of concept demonstrates the effective detection of anomalies in log data of a building access control system stemming from card misuse, including stolen access cards and cloned cards.

13 August 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MLMax Landauer
Max Landauer
FSFlorian Skopik
Florian Skopik
MWMarkus Wurzenberger
Markus Wurzenberger
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) reinforce cyber defense by autonomously monitoring various data sources for traces of attacks. However, IDSs are also infamous for frequently raising false positives and alerts that are difficult to interpret without context. This results in high workloads on security operators who need to manually verify all reported alerts, often leading to fatigue and incorrect decisions. To generate more meaningful alerts and alleviate these issues, the research domain focused on multi-step attack analysis proposes approaches for filtering, clustering, and correlating IDS alerts, as well as generation of attack graphs. Unfortunately, existing data sets are outdated, unreliable, narrowly focused, or only suitable for IDS evaluation. Since hardly any suitable benchmark data sets are publicly available, researchers often resort to private data sets that prevent reproducibility of evaluations. We thus propose AIT-ADS, a new alert data set that we publish alongside this paper. The data set contains alerts from three distinct IDSs monitoring eight executions of a multi-step attack as well as simulations of normal user behavior. To illustrate the potential of our data set, we experiment with open-source tools for attack graph extraction.