This article applies the concepts of ‘transnationalism’ and ‘state-private networks’ to early Cold War Britain to analyze the aims and methods of governmental and non-governmental counter-subversion and propaganda in the ‘Cultural Cold War’. Using recently declassified and underutilized files, the article explores the roles of the Official Committee on Communism (Home) and, more particularly, the Foreign Office Information Research Department. The Attlee and Churchill administrations of the late 1940s and early 1950s increasingly perceived the primary non-military threat of communism to Britain as part of Soviet-inspired transnational subversion of western European societies. This created a growing impetus for a symmetrical, transnational response through both domestic and foreign clandestine ‘indoctrination’ campaigns operating via influential non-state British institutions. Despite constitutional concerns still relevant today, in 1951 ministers endorsed the domestic component of this response as a fully-fledged strategy that would encourage greater state intervention in British society in the Cold War struggle for both liberty and security.
There is a worldwide need for reagents to perform SARS-CoV-2 detection. Some laboratories have implemented kit-free protocols, but many others do not have the capacity to develop these and/or perform manual processing. We provide multiple workflows for SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid detection in clinical samples by comparing several commercially available RNA extraction methods: QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (QIAgen), RNAdvance Blood/Viral (Beckman) and Mag-Bind Viral DNA/RNA 96 Kit (Omega Bio-tek). We also compared One-step RT-qPCR reagents: TaqMan Fast Virus 1-Step Master Mix (FastVirus, ThermoFisher Scientific), qPCRBIO Probe 1-Step Go Lo-ROX (PCR Biosystems) and Luna ® Universal Probe One-Step RT-qPCR Kit (Luna, NEB). We used primer-probes that detect viral N (EUA CDC) and RdRP (PHE guidelines). All RNA extraction methods provided similar results. FastVirus and Luna proved most sensitive. N detection was more reliable than that of RdRP, particularly in samples with low viral titres. Importantly, we demonstrate that treatment of nasopharyngeal swabs with 70 degrees for 10 or 30 min, or 90 degrees for 10 or 30 min (both original variant and B 1.1.7) inactivates SARS-CoV-2 employing plaque assays, and that it has minimal impact on the sensitivity of the qPCR in clinical samples. These findings make SARS-CoV-2 testing portable to settings that do not have CL-3 facilities. In summary, we provide several testing pipelines that can be easily implemented in other laboratories and have made all our protocols and SOPs freely available at https://osf.io/uebvj/ .
Islamist violent extremist (IVE) groups are frequently involved in civil conflicts. Indeed, some groups owe their origins to conflict, and tens of thousands of Islamists have chosen to participate in conflicts taking place in foreign countries in the past 35 years. Increasingly, IVE groups appear to have the capacity to influence the conflicts they are involved in, and are influenced in turn by their experiences. As a result, for those working on conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, the involvement of IVE groups raises questions of whether traditional responses remain adequate. Drawing on three country case studies – Nigeria, Kenya and Iraq/Syria, this article examines the similarities and differences between IVE groups and other conflict actors, and what this means for development, state-building and peacebuilding responses
While numerous studies have examined Tanzania’s political, economic and social development either side of independence, the development of its security sector and its interaction with external actors within this context is not well understood. This partly reflects case-specific methodological challenges, tackled here through multiple overseas sources, but also the relative absence of research on intelligence and security communities in the Global South more generally. Approaching this lacunae head on, this article draws on security assistance literature related to ‘patron-client relations’ and ‘principal-agent’ theory to trace the nature and impact of limited British security assistance pre-independence, before demonstrating how and why significant change characterised Tanzania’s increasingly politicised and unstable security sector and its key international liaison partners post-independence. These changes would quickly end British hopes of integrating Tanzania into a ‘Commonwealth security culture’ of friendly post-colonial states, with Tanzania charting its own non-aligned path through a competition of Cold War patrons.