Jingdian Ming

Jingdian Ming

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Jingdian Ming

School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 December 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YLYuejun Liu
Yuejun Liu
YZYongbin Zhou
Yongbin Zhou
SSShuo Sun
Shuo Sun
TWTianyu Wang
Tianyu Wang
Rui ZhangRui Zhang
Rui Zhang
JMJingdian Ming
Jingdian Ming
Leakages during the signing process, including partial key exposure and partial (or complete) randomness exposure, may be devastating for the security of digital signatures. In this work, we investigate the security of lattice-based Fiat-Shamir signatures in the presence of randomness leakage. To this end, we present a generic key recovery attack that relies on minimum leakage of randomness, and then theoretically connect it to a variant of Integer-LWE (ILWE) problem. The ILWE problem, introduced by Bootle et al. at Asiacrypt 2018, is to recover the secret vector s given polynomially many samples of the form $({\text{a}}, \langle {\text{a}}, {\text{s}} \rangle + \text {e}) \in \mathbb {Z}^{\text {n}+1}$ , and it is solvable if the error $\text {e} \in \mathbb {Z}$ is not superpolynomially larger than the inner product $\langle {\text{a}}, {\text{s}} \rangle $ . However, in our variant (we call the variant FS-ILWE problem in this paper), ${\text{a}}\in \mathbb {Z}^{\text {n}}$ is a sparse vector whose coefficients are NOT independent any more, and e is related to a and s as well. We prove that the FS-ILWE problem can be solved in polynomial time, and present an efficient algorithm to solve it. Our generic key recovery method directly implies that many lattice-based Fiat-Shamir signatures will be totally broken with one (deterministic or probabilistic) bit of randomness leakage per signature. Our attack has been validated by experiments on two NIST PQC signatures Dilithium and qTESLA. For example, as to Dilithium-III of 125-bit quantum security, the secret key will be recovered within 10 seconds over an ordinary PC desktop, with about one million signatures. Similarly, key recovery attacks on Dilithium under other parameters and qTESLA will be completed within 20 seconds and 31 minutes respectively. In addition, we also present a non-profiled attack to show how to obtain the required randomness bit in practice through power analysis attacks on a proof-of-concept implementation of polynomial addition. The experimental results confirm the practical feasibility of our method.

19 October 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZQZehua Qiao
Zehua Qiao
YLYuejun Liu
Yuejun Liu
YZYongbin Zhou
Yongbin Zhou
JMJingdian Ming
Jingdian Ming
CJChengbin Jin
Chengbin Jin
HLHuizhong Li
Huizhong Li
Side-channel security has become a significant concern in the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process. The lattice-based CRYSTALS-Dilithium (abbr. Dilithium) becomes the primary signature standard algorithm recommended by NIST for most use cases in July 2022 due to its excellent performance in security and efficiency. Compared to Dilithium’s rich theoretical security analysis results, the side-channel security of its physical implementations needs to be further explored. In 2021, Liu et al. proposed a two-stage randomness leakage attack against Dilithium, in which only one randomness bit with a probability $> 0.5$ per signature is enough to recover the private key. However, they only carried out proof-of-concept experiments on “research-oriented” reference implementation of polynomial addition. Whether this method applies to complete real-world implementations of Dilithium is unknown. In this paper, we put this randomness leakage attack into real-world and recover the private key of unprotected and masked Dilithium on Arm Cortex-M4 processor using non-profiled power analysis attacks. Since randomness is introduced in the signing process, it is challenging to recover the randomness bit of Dilithium with high success rate in only one trace. Inspired by Liu et al., we propose a new non-profiled attack called Public Template Attack (PTA), a template-attack-like method that builds templates using public information. With PTA, we recover the randomness bit of unprotected and masked Dilithium with a success rate of 95% and 62% in one power trace, respectively. To demonstrate practicality, we perform practical power analysis attacks against different security levels of round 3 unprotected and masked Dilithium on STM32F405 microprocessor. Using 10,000 traces, the private key of unprotected Dilithium2 is recovered in 0.5 hours with an ordinary PC desktop. Our attack is 240 times faster than the state-of-the-art non-profiled attack. Moreover, the private key of masked Dilithium2 is recovered using 680,000 traces in 38 hours. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to successfully attack masked Dilithium using non-profiled attacks.

14 May 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JMJingdian Ming
Jingdian Ming
YZYongbin Zhou
Yongbin Zhou
Wei ChengWei Cheng
Wei Cheng
HLHuizhong Li
Huizhong Li
GYGuang Yang
Guang Yang
QZQian Zhang
Qian Zhang
Low Entropy Masking Schemes (LEMS) have attracted wide attention due to their implementations simplicity and relatively good performance in protecting cryptographic implementations against Side-Channel- Attacks (SCAs). To achieve desired security, it is necessary (but not sufficient) to find proper low entropy mask sets to protect all sensitive secret-dependant intermediate variables. However, one crucial problem concerning this intuitive idea is that what ‘proper’ mask sets should be. To formally capture such crucial qualification, we introduce the notion of balancedness to characterize this natural attribute of mask sets themselves. Considering that this notion is limited to characterize first-order security, we generalize it to d-dimension balancedness to accommodate dth-order security, then we exhibit lower and upper bounds on d-dimension balancedness for any d. With the help of these essential definitions, we prove that no balanced low entropy mask set really exists, which implies that LEMS implementations always have vulnerabilities in theory due to the unbalancedness of underlying mask sets. In order to further demonstrate the practical implications of balancedness, we show 4 different kinds of attacks on three state-ofthe- art LEMS implementations. Specifically, the distribution attack proposed in this paper is a general first-order attack on LEMS. The results demonstrate that unbalanced mask sets actually do lead to serious vulnerabilities.

26 September 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JMJingdian Ming
Jingdian Ming
YZYongbin Zhou
Yongbin Zhou
Wei ChengWei Cheng
Wei Cheng
HLHuizhong Li
Huizhong Li
In recent years, inner product masking (IPM) has been proposed as a promising code based masking scheme against side-channel attacks. However, most studies mainly focus on leakages in terms of information-theoretic metrics, and simulated experiments utilizing profiled attacks (with known templates). In this paper, we investigate the security of IPM scheme against one typical non-profiled side-channel attack, namely higher-order correlation analysis. We demonstrate that three factors mainly influence the efficiency of higher-order correlation analysis against IPM, and they are the attack order vector, output size of the target function and attack model. In particular, we propose a new method to measure the efficiency of higher-order correlation analyses. Generally speaking, this method is based on the correlation coefficient between leakage expectations with certain shares and sensitive values under the attack model. We validate our method by both simulation-based experiments and practical one with different attack factors. All experiments are running on the IPM in the different noise scenarios. The results demonstrate that our method works well as an indicator for higher-order correlation analyses against IPM.

5 July 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Wei ChengWei Cheng
Wei Cheng
JMJingdian Ming
Jingdian Ming
Sylvain GuilleySylvain Guilley
Sylvain Guilley
JDJean-Luc Danger
Jean-Luc Danger
Masking is one of the most well-established methods to thwart side-channel attacks. Many masking schemes have been proposed in the literature, and code-based masking emerges and unifies several masking schemes in a coding-theoretic framework. In this work, we investigate the side-channel resistance of code-based masking from a non-profiling perspective by utilizing correlation-based side-channel attacks. We present a systematic evaluation of correlation attacks with various higher-order (centered) moments and then present the form of optimal correlation attacks. Interestingly, the Pearson correlation coefficient between the hypothetical leakage and the measured traces is connected to the signal-to-noise ratio in higher-order moments, and it turns out to be easy to evaluate rather than launch repeated attacks. We also identify some ineffective higher-order correlation attacks at certain orders when the device leaks under the Hamming weight leakage model. Our theoretical findings are verified through both simulated and real-world measurements.

24 August 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
SSShuo Sun
Shuo Sun
YZYongbin Zhou
Yongbin Zhou
Rui ZhangRui Zhang
Rui Zhang
YTYang Tao
Yang Tao
ZQZehua Qiao
Zehua Qiao
JMJingdian Ming
Jingdian Ming