Jodi Dianetti

Jodi Dianetti

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Jodi Dianetti

Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 August 2023 in Mathematics of Operations Research
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JDJodi Dianetti
Jodi Dianetti
GFGiorgio Ferrari
Giorgio Ferrari
MFMarkus Fischer
Markus Fischer
MNMax Nendel
Max Nendel
We provide an abstract framework for submodular mean field games and identify verifiable sufficient conditions that allow us to prove the existence and approximation of strong mean field equilibria in models where data may not be continuous with respect to the measure parameter and common noise is allowed. The setting is general enough to encompass qualitatively different problems, such as mean field games for discrete time finite space Markov chains, singularly controlled and reflected diffusions, and mean field games of optimal timing. Our analysis hinges on Tarski’s fixed point theorem, along with technical results on lattices of flows of probability and subprobability measures.Funding: Financial support by the German Research Foundation [Collaborative Research Centre Grant 1283/2 2021–317210226] is acknowledged.

28 October 2022 in Mathematics of Operations Research
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HCHaoyang Cao
Haoyang Cao
JDJodi Dianetti
Jodi Dianetti
GFGiorgio Ferrari
Giorgio Ferrari
We study stationary mean field games with singular controls in which the representative player interacts with a long-time weighted average of the population through a discounted and ergodic performance criteria. This class of games finds natural applications in the context of optimal productivity expansion in dynamic oligopolies. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the mean field equilibria, which are completely characterized through nonlinear equations. Furthermore, we relate the mean field equilibria for the discounted and ergodic games by showing the validity of an Abelian limit. The latter also allows us to approximate Nash equilibria of—so far unexplored—symmetric N-player ergodic singular control games through the mean field equilibrium of the discounted game. Numerical examples finally illustrate in a case study the dependency of the mean field equilibria with respect to the parameters of the games. Funding: The authors acknowledge financial support from the Alan Turing Institute and CMAP, École Polytechnique during this project. Funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) – Project-ID 317210226 – SFB 1283.

17 May 2023 in Stochastic Processes and their Applications
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JDJodi Dianetti
Jodi Dianetti
GFGiorgio Ferrari
Giorgio Ferrari

1 February 2019 in arXiv
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JDJodi Dianetti
Jodi Dianetti
GFGiorgio Ferrari
Giorgio Ferrari
We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with submodular costs. We call these games "monotone-follower games". In a not necessarily Markovian setting, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria. Moreover, we introduce a sequence of approximating games by restricting, for each natural number n, the players' admissible strategies to the set of Lipschitz processes with Lipschitz constant bounded by n. We prove that, for each n, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the approximating game and that the sequence of Nash equilibria converges, in the Meyer-Zheng sense, to a weak (distributional) Nash equilibrium of the original game of singular control. As a byproduct, such a convergence also provides approximation results of the equilibrium values across the two classes of games. We finally show how our findings can be employed to prove existence of open-loop Nash equilibria in an N-player stochastic differential game with singular controls, and we propose an algorithm to determine a Nash equilibrium for the monotone-follower game.

19 May 2023 in arXiv
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JDJodi Dianetti
Jodi Dianetti
GFGiorgio Ferrari
Giorgio Ferrari
We characterize the optimal control for a class of singular stochastic control problems as the unique solution to a related Skorokhod reflection problem. The considered optimization problems concern the minimization of a discounted cost functional over an infinite time-horizon through a process of bounded variation affecting an It\^o-diffusion. The setting is multidimensional, the drift of the state equation and the costs are convex, the volatility matrix can be constant or linear in the state. We prove that the optimal control acts only when the underlying diffusion attempts to exit the so-called waiting region, and that the direction of this action is prescribed by the derivative of the value function. Our approach is based on the study of a suitable monotonicity property of the derivative of the value function through its interpretation as the value of an optimal stopping game. Such a monotonicity allows to construct nearly optimal policies which reflect the underlying diffusion at the boundary of approximating waiting regions. The limit of this approximation scheme then provides the desired characterization. Our result applies to a relevant class of linear-quadratic models, among others. Furthermore, it allows to construct the optimal control in degenerate and non degenerate settings considered in the literature, where this important aspect was only partially addressed.

16 December 2023 in Decisions in Economics and Finance
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JDJodi Dianetti
Jodi Dianetti