Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass

Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass

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Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass

Department of Electrical Engineering and Electronics, College of Engineering, University of Thi-Qar, Thi-Qar, Iraq

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 April 2017 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AAAhmed A. Alabdel Abass
Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass
LXLiang Xiao
Liang Xiao
NMNarayan B. Mandayam
Narayan B. Mandayam
ZGZoran Gajic
Zoran Gajic
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) represent stealthy, powerful, long-term, and well-funded attacks against cyber systems, such as data centers and cloud storage. Evolutionary game theory is used to capture the long-term continuous behavior of the APTs on the cloud storage devices. Two APT defense games with discrete strategies are formulated, in which both an APT attacker and a defender compete to control one or multiple storage devices regarding their attack or defense intervals. The dynamical stability of each defense and attack strategy pair is studied according to the replicator dynamics criteria to characterize the locally asymptotically stable equilibrium strategies. The evolutionary stable strategy is discussed in each game, which is a subset of the asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium (NE). The phase portraits provide the locally asymptotically stable points of the APT defense game, which represent the NE showing the relationship between the asymptotic stability and evolutionary stability.

11 December 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AAAhmed A. Alabdel Abass
Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass
RKRatnesh Kumbhkar
Ratnesh Kumbhkar
NMNarayan B. Mandayam
Narayan B. Mandayam
Zoran GajicZoran Gajic
Zoran Gajic

24 February 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AAAhmed A. Alabdel Abass
Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass
NMNarayan B. Mandayam
Narayan B. Mandayam
ZGZoran Gajic
Zoran Gajic
We consider an evolutionary game on a graph under the condition that players perception of uncertainty and decision making can follow either an objective expected utility theory (EUT) model or a subjective prospect theory (PT) model. Each player chooses one of two strategies with probabilities x and 1-x, where the subjective players bias their choices of the probabilities to be w(x) and w(1-x) to reflect the probability weighting effect of PT. We derive the conditions to achieve a locally asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium (NE) and the necessary conditions to achieve an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We illustrate these results through a simple random access channel game. We find that players' behavior is affected by the total number of players as well as the number of each type of players (objective or subjective). We show that increasing the number of interacting players induces an aggressive transmission strategy and the behavior becomes similar for both types of players. Moreover, we let the objective and subjective players adjust their transmission under throughput rewards, delay penalties, and energy costs. The EUT players' throughput is higher than the PT players' throughput for a small number of interacting players and equal to if the number of interacting players increases.

1 December 2024 in University of Thi-Qar Journal for Engineering Sciences
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AAAhmed A. Alabdel Abass
Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass
HAHuda Anwar
Huda Anwar
HAHisham S. Alshaheen
Hisham S. Alshaheen
Wireless body area networks (WBANs) are noteworthy, dependable, and most advantageous development in many health directed applications. WBANs in health system connect tiny sensors to invasive or non-invasive medical equipment for patient examinations utilizing low power wireless technology. When WBANs are utilized in crowded areas or in conjunction with other wireless sensor networks, communication interference can arise. This can lead to unstable signal integrity, which can impair system performance. Thus, interference mitigation needs to be taken into account when designing. In this paper we survey interference mitigation methods used in WBANs, classify them, and finally point to some future research directions in this area. In particular, we start by reviewing sample papers that tackle the interference management problem through classical signal processing and shaping methods. Then we review some works on cooperative communications approaches to encounter this problem. After that we consider approaches that are not centralized through the use of game theoretic formulations. We close our discussion by surveying model free algorithm through learning based approaches.

15 October 2020 in IET Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HCHussain K. Chaiel
Hussain K. Chaiel
AAAhmed A. Alabdel Abass
Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass
We consider, as a game, the competition between sensors' transmissions in a structure‐free wireless sensor network. They contemplate two nodes at the same level strategically optimising their decisions over a finite set of strategies. Specifically, they consider two strategies are available to each node. Nodes can choose to transmit to keep the network updated, but at the risk of not sensing during the transmission time and the potential of sending repeated information if other nodes have already transmitted that information. Nodes can choose to sense the environment to detect new events, but this strategy leaves the network with outdated information if all nodes adopt it. As a result, nodes have to strategically make their decisions depending on the nodes' parameters, the importance of information, and the locations of the head nodes. They tackle this decision‐making problem using two game theoretic models: a non‐cooperative two‐player game model and a potential game model. They derive the Nash equilibria (NE) and highlight their existence conditions. Finally, they use learning algorithms that use local information at each node to reach the NE. These algorithms are the fictitious play (FP) algorithm and a modified FP that is inspired by the cumulative proportional reinforcement algorithm.

15 December 2024 in IET Wireless Sensor Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AAAhmed A. Alabdel Abass
Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass
In this paper, the problem of attack mitigation in an intelligent transportation network or vehicular network is considered as a game. The player’s perception of uncertainty and decision making is studied under a subjective prospect theoretic (PT) model and an objective expected utility theory (EUT) model. A game where each player chooses one of two strategies with certain probabilities is analysed. The case where subjective players bias their choices of the probabilities using the Prelec weighting function is considered and compared with the EUT based decisions and the effect of the framing effect function and . The corresponding Nash equilibria (NE) are derived and found through the replicator dynamic equation. Under the Prelec function, the results agree with the previously published results that the defender is biased more into defending the more important road side units. However, under both the function and the framing effect, the players' behaviour does not depend on the loss penalty parameter, and the Prelec function dominates the framing effect. For small values, the players make conservative decisions compared to higher values regardless of the effect of the framing function. For high values the players are more certain in their decisions than the EUT players.