Conventionally, the control channel on network switches has always been out-of-band. With the emergence of high-performance systems built upon programmable switches, the out-of-band control channel has become the bottleneck. Thus, there is an emerging trend of implementing the control channel in the data path (i.e., in-band) on programmable switches to achieve high throughput and low-latency control actions. However, the use of in-band control channels comes with the risk of security vulnerabilities that have not been explored in prior literature. In this paper, we present P4EAD, a cryptographic primitive to secure the in-band control channels on programmable switches entirely in the data plane. This ensures the integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of in-band control messages. We conduct micro-benchmarks on P4EAD and demonstrate its integration with an existing high-performance in-band control framework, showcasing minimal performance impact when securing the control channel.
The Internet has historically been built on the assumption of a smart edge and a dumb network. This design philosophy is also reflected in end-to-end Internet congestion control. The stability and general fairness of the current Internet are heavily reliant on end hosts implementing congestion control algorithms (CCAs) correctly. Maintaining fairness between flows on the Internet with end-host-based algorithms is a hard problem. Even when the Internet was dominated by a homogeneous mix of loss-based AIMD CCAs, unfairness was an issue between flows with different RTTs [11]. While some delay-based algorithms were able to achieve RTT fairness, they became susceptible to unfairness arising from a late-comer advantage [1].