Xuheng Li

Xuheng Li

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Xuheng Li

Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 October 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CYChenyuan Yang
Chenyuan Yang
XLXuheng Li
Xuheng Li
RMRakib Hossain Misu
Rakib Hossain Misu
JYJianan Yao
Jianan Yao
WCWeidong Cui
Weidong Cui
SLShan Lu
Shan Lu
Generative AI has shown its value for many software engineering tasks. Still in its infancy, large language model (LLM)-based proof generation lags behind LLM-based code generation. In this paper, we present AutoVerus. AutoVerus uses LLMs to automatically generate correctness proof for Rust code. AutoVerus is designed to match the unique features of Verus, a verification tool that can prove the correctness of Rust code using proofs and specifications also written in Rust. AutoVerus consists of a network of agents that are crafted and orchestrated to mimic human experts' three phases of proof construction: preliminary proof generation, proof refinement guided by generic tips, and proof debugging guided by verification errors. To thoroughly evaluate AutoVerus and help foster future research in this direction, we have built a benchmark suite of 150 non-trivial proof tasks, based on existing code-generation benchmarks and verification benchmarks. Our evaluation shows that AutoVerus can automatically generate correct proof for more than 90% of them, with more than half of them tackled in less than 30 seconds or 3 LLM calls.

22 March 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
GYGanxiang Yang
Ganxiang Yang
WQWei Qiang
Wei Qiang
YRYi Rong
Yi Rong
XLXuheng Li
Xuheng Li
FYFanqi Yu
Fanqi Yu
RGRonghui Gu
Ronghui Gu
System software is often complex and hides exploitable security vulnerabilities. Formal verification promises bug-free software but comes with a prohibitive proof cost. We present Spoq2, the first verification framework to highly automate security verification of unmodified system software. Spoq2 is based on the observation that many security properties, such as noninterference, can be reduced to establishing inductive invariants on individual transitions of a transition system that models system software. However, directly verifying such invariants for real system code overwhelms existing SMT solvers. Spoq2 makes this possible by automatically reducing verification complexity. It decomposes transitions into individual execution paths, extends cone-of-influence analysis to the individual transition level, and eliminates irrelevant machine states, clauses, and control-flow paths before invoking the SMT solver. Spoq2 further optimizes how pointer operations are modeled and verified through pointer abstractions that eliminate expensive bit-wise operations from SMT queries. We demonstrate the effectiveness of Spoq2 by verifying security properties of four unmodified, real-world system codebases with minimal manual effort.