11 January 2021 in IEEE Access
Artificial intelligence shows promise for solving many practical societal problems in areas such as healthcare and transportation. However, the current mechanisms for AI model diffusion such as Github code repositories, academic project webpages, and commercial AI marketplaces have some limitations; for example, a lack of monetization methods, model traceability, and model auditabilty. In this work, we sketch guidelines for a new AI diffusion method based on a decentralized online marketplace. We consider the technical, economic, and regulatory aspects of such a marketplace including a discussion of solutions for problems in these areas. Finally, we include a comparative analysis of several current AI marketplaces that are already available or in development. We find that most of these marketplaces are centralized commercial marketplaces with relatively few models.
8 June 2020 in ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems
Service liability interconnections among globally networked IT- and IoT-driven service organizations create potential channels for cascading service disruptions worth billions of dollars, due to modern cyber-crimes such as DDoS, APT, and ransomware attacks. A natural question that arises in this context is: What is the likelihood of a cyber-blackout? , where the latter term is defined as the probability that all (or a major subset of) organizations in a service chain become dysfunctional in a certain manner due to a cyber-attack at some or all points in the chain. The answer to this question has major implications to risk management businesses such as cyber-insurance when it comes to designing policies by risk-averse insurers for providing coverage to clients in the aftermath of such catastrophic network events. In this article, we investigate this question in general as a function of service chain networks and different cyber-loss distribution types. We show somewhat surprisingly (and discuss the potential practical implications) that, following a cyber-attack, the effect of (a) a network interconnection topology and (b) a wide range of loss distributions on the probability of a cyber-blackout and the increase in total service-related monetary losses across all organizations are mostly very small. The primary rationale behind these results are attributed to degrees of heterogeneity in the revenue base among organizations and the Increasing Failure Rate property of popular (i.i.d/non-i.i.d) loss distributions, i.e., log-concave cyber-loss distributions. The result will enable risk-averse cyber-risk managers to safely infer the impact of cyber-attacks in a worst-case network and distribution oblivious setting.
7 August 2020 in IEEE Access
In the modern era of the mobile apps (the era of surveillance capitalism - as termed by Shoshana Zuboff) huge quantities of surveillance data about consumers and their activities offer a wave of opportunities for economic and societal value creation. ln-app advertising - a multi-billion dollar industry, is an essential part of the current digital ecosystem driven by free mobile applications, where the ecosystem entities usually comprise consumer apps, their clients (consumers), ad-networks, and advertisers. Sensitive consumer information is often being sold downstream in this ecosystem without the knowledge of consumers, and in many cases to their annoyance. While this practice, in cases, may result in long-term benefits for the consumers, it can result in serious information privacy breaches of very significant impact (e.g., breach of genetic data) in the short term. The question we raise through this paper is: Is it economically feasible to trade consumer personal information with their formal consent (permission) and in return provide them incentives (monetary or otherwise)?. In view of (a) the behavioral assumption that humans are ‘compromising’ beings and have privacy preferences, (b) privacy as a good not having strict boundaries, and (c) the practical inevitability of inappropriate data leakage by data holders downstream in the data-release supply-chain, we propose a design of regulated efficient/bounded inefficient economic mechanisms for oligopoly data trading markets using a novel preference function bidding approach on a simplified sellers-broker market. Our methodology preserves the heterogeneous privacy preservation constraints (at a grouped consumer, i.e., app, level) upto certain compromise levels, and at the same time satisfies information demand (via the broker) of agencies (e.g., advertising organizations) that collect client data for the purpose of targeted behavioral advertising.
22 November 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing
Recent emergence of the small cloud (SC) has been driven mainly by issues like service cost and complexity of commercial cloud providers. However, the resource inelasticity problem faced by the SCs due to their relatively scarce resources might lead to customer QoS degradation and revenue loss. A proposed solution to this problem recommends sharing of resources between competing SCs to alleviate potential resource inelasticity issues. A recent effort ([28]) proposed SC-Share, a performance-driven static market model for competitive small clouds that results in an efficient market equilibrium jointly optimizing customer QoS satisfaction and SC revenue generation. However, an important question still remains to be answered, without which SC sharing markets may not be guaranteed to sustain in the long-run - is it still possible to achieve a stable market efficient state when the supply of SC resources is dynamic? In this short paper, we take a first step to addressing the problem of efficient market design for single SC resource sharing in dynamic environments. We answer our previous question in the affirmative through the use of Arrow and Hurwicz's disequilibrium process in economics, and the gradient play technique that allows us to iteratively converge upon efficient and stable market equilibria.