Hua Chen

Hua Chen

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Hua Chen

Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 June 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DCDongyu Chen
Dongyu Chen
HCHua Chen
Hua Chen
LFLimin Fan
Limin Fan
KLKai Luo
Kai Luo
Statistical tests for randomness play an essential role in cryptography, but the reliability of these tests is rarely taken into account, which may mislead our judgement of randomness especially with extremely large samples. In this paper, we make a two-stage error analysis of the commonly used two-level randomness tests in the NIST SP 800-22 test suite. Especially, we give the estimates of the p -value deviations of chi-square approximation in the basic tests based on our proposed continuity constraints, and mathematically express the reliability of uniformity test used in the test suite with the fact of noncentral chi-square approximation. Finally, we analyze the respective error factors and derive the corresponding probability deviation estimation for the tests, explaining some false positive issues in practical test experiments. With our derived error analysis models, one can get a more reliable randomness test strategy with extremely large samples and wider parameter selections.

28 June 2007 in Chinese Physics Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CHChen Hua
Chen Hua
QYQu Yuan-Gang
Qu Yuan-Gang
PWPeng Wei-Xian
Peng Wei-Xian
Tingyun KuangTingyun Kuang
Tingyun Kuang
LLLi Liang-Bi
Li Liang-Bi
WLWang Li
Wang Li

31 January 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FYFu Yao
Fu Yao
HCHua Chen
Hua Chen
YWYongzhuang Wei
Yongzhuang Wei
EPEnes Pasalic
Enes Pasalic
FZFeng Zhou
Feng Zhou
LFLimin Fan
Limin Fan
Threshold implementation (TI) is a well-known Boolean masking technique that provides provable security against side-channel attacks. In the presence of glitches, the probing model was replaced by the so-called glitch-extended probing model which specifies a broader security framework. In CHES 2021, Shahmirzadi et al. introduced a general search method for finding first-order 2-share TI schemes without fresh randomness (under the presence of glitches) for a given encryption algorithm. Although it handles well single-output Boolean functions, this method has to store output shares in registers when extended to vector Boolean functions, which results in more chip area and increased latency. Therefore, the design of TI schemes that have low-implementation cost under the glitch-extended probing model appears to be an important research challenge. In this article, we propose an approach to design the first-order glitch-extended probing secure TI schemes when quadratic functions are employed in the substitution layer. This method only requires a small amount of fresh random bits and a single clock cycle for its implementation. In particular, the random bits in our approach are reusable and compatible with the changing of the guards technique. Our dedicated TI scheme for the AES cipher gives 20.23% smaller implementation area and 4.2% faster encryption compared to the TI scheme of AES (without using fresh randomness) proposed in CHES 2021. Additionally, we propose a parallel implementation of two S-boxes that further reduces latency (about $39.83\%$ ) at the expense of increasing the chip area by 9%. We have positively confirmed the security of AES under the glitch-extended probing model using the verification tool—SILVER and the side-channel leakage assessment method—TVLA.

1 March 2023 in Chinese Journal of Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZJZhipeng Jiao
Zhipeng Jiao
HCHua Chen
Hua Chen
JFJingyi Feng
Jingyi Feng
XKXiaoyun Kuang
Xiaoyun Kuang
YYYiwei Yang
Yiwei Yang
LFLimin Fan
Limin Fan
Side-channel attack (SCA) and fault attack (FA) are two classical physical attacks against cryptographic implementation. In order to resist them, we present a combined countermeasure scheme which can resist both SCA and FA. The scheme combines threshold implementation and duplication-based exchange techniques. The exchange technique can confuse the fault propagation path and randomize the faulty values. The threshold implementation technique can ensure a provable security against SCA. Moreover, it can also help to resist the FA by its incomplete property and random numbers. Compared with other methods, the proposed scheme has simple structure, which can be easily implemented in hardware and result in a low implementation cost. Finally, we present a detailed design for the block cipher light encryption device (LED) and implement it. The hardware cost evaluation shows our scheme has the minimum overhead factor.

23 December 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HLHaoyuan Li
Haoyuan Li
HCHua Chen
Hua Chen
XHXucang Han
Xucang Han
WCWeiqiong Cao
Weiqiong Cao
XZXiang Zhu
Xiang Zhu
JWJian Wang
Jian Wang
ECC is a widely used public key cryptosystem. Though it has good theoretical security, it is still vulnerable to some physical attacks due to the implementation weakness. To resist the attacks, a number of physical countermeasures have been proposed. However, there are still some implementation vulnerabilities that may be overlooked, leading to more practical and effective attacks. In this paper, we construct a new fault attack on round counter which is a component of scalar multiplications in ECDSA. The attack is divided into two parts. In the first part, the partial bits of nonce in each signature can be recovered by the fault injection on round counter. In the second part, an efficient lattice attack can be constructed to recover the private key by combining the recovered bits. Compared with other lattice-based fault attacks, our attack has the advantage of practicability and effectiveness. Especially it has less requirement of moment precision and wide applicability of scalar multiplications, which is the critical factors for practicability and effectiveness. To verify the strength of our attack, we carry on the laser injection experiments respectively on an AVR MCU(ATmega163L) and a Kintex-7 FPGA(XC7K325T). The experiment results verify the practicability and effectiveness of the attack in both software and hardware platform. Finally, we also propose two directions for efficient countermeasures against our attack.

1 January 2023 in IET Information Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
FYFu Yao
Fu Yao
YWYongzhuang Wei
Yongzhuang Wei
HCHua Chen
Hua Chen
EPEnes Pasalic
Enes Pasalic
Since their introduction in early 2000, CPA (correlation power analysis), as a cryptographic tool, has been widely used in the cryptanalysis of cryptographic algorithms (being applicable to both symmetric key ciphers as well as to public key encryption schemes). An application of the classical CPA method, along with its variants, to cryptographic algorithms that use parallel implementation of its substitution boxes (S‐boxes) commonly requires more power traces to extract the secret key compared to the case when serial implementation of S‐boxes is employed. To reduce the amount of power traces in this scenario, we propose a modification of the standard CPA approaches and demonstrate practically that our method performs better than the existing ones in this respect. To verify the efficiency of our improved CPA method, we apply it to the public databases of DPA Contest V2. In particular, the experimental results show that only 495 power traces are required to recover the secret key of AES. We also compare the performance of our attack to the relevant methods whose parameters are available at DPA Contest V2. The results show that compared to the best nonprofiling side‐channel attack (SCA) attack, our method reduces the number of power traces required to recover the secret key by 6,566. Also, our new method performs almost similarly as the best profiling SCA attack of Benoit Gerard (in terms of the required number of power traces), thus reducing the gap in the performance of profiling and nonprofiling SCA attacks.