1 February 2008 in Journal of Theoretical Biology
1 March 2008 in Journal of Theoretical Biology
14 January 2015 in Scientific Reports
We introduce a two layer network model for social coordination incorporating two relevant ingredients: a) different networks of interaction to learn and to obtain a pay-off, and b) decision making processes based both on social and strategic motivations. Two populations of agents are distributed in two layers with intralayer learning processes and playing interlayer a coordination game. We find that the skepticism about the wisdom of crowd and the local connectivity are the driving forces to accomplish full coordination of the two populations, while polarized coordinated layers are only possible for all-to-all interactions. Local interactions also allow for full coordination in the socially efficient Pareto-dominant strategy in spite of being the riskier one.
18 August 2009 in The European Physical Journal B
21 April 2006 in Computational Economics
1 August 2020 in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
JGJuan Carlos González-Avella
Juan Carlos González-Avella
Anticoordination and chimera states occur in a two-layer model of learning and coordination dynamics in fully connected networks. Learning occurs in the intra-layer networks, while a coordination game is played in the inter-layer network. In this paper, we study the robustness of these states against local effects introduced by the local connectivity of random networks. We identify threshold values for the mean degree of the networks such that below these values, local effects prevent the existence of anticoordination and chimera states found in the fully connected setting. Local effects in the intra-layer learning network are more important than in the inter-layer network in preventing the existence of anticoordination states. The local connectivity of the intra- and inter-layer networks is important to avoid the occurrence of chimera states, but the local effects are stronger in the inter-layer coordination network than in the intra-layer learning network. We also study the effect of local connectivity on the problem of equilibrium selection in the asymmetric coordination game, showing that local effects favor the selection of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in situations in which the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in the fully connected network. In this case, again, the important local effects are those associated with the coordination dynamics inter-layer network. Indeed, lower average degree of the network connectivity between layers reduces the probability of achieving the risk-dominant strategy, favoring the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.