Jeroen Van Bouwel

Jeroen Van Bouwel

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Jeroen Van Bouwel

Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

25Years (2002-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 November 2002 in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
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JBJeroen Van Bouwel
Jeroen Van Bouwel
EWErik Weber
Erik Weber

19 August 2010 in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
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LVLeen De Vreese
Leen De Vreese
EWErik Weber
Erik Weber
JBJeroen Van Bouwel
Jeroen Van Bouwel

29 April 2008 in History and Theory
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JBJeroen VAN Bouwel
Jeroen VAN Bouwel
EWErik Weber
Erik Weber

1 August 2017 in Social Epistemology
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JBJeroen Van Bouwel
Jeroen Van Bouwel
MOMichiel Van Oudheusden
Michiel Van Oudheusden
In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how these formats delegitimize conflict and disagreement by making a strong appeal to consensus. Based on our direct involvement in these formats and informed both by political philosophy and science and technology studies, we outline conceptions that contrast with the consensus ideal, including dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonistic democracy. Drawing on the notion of meta-consensus and a distinction between four models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative, participatory and agonistic), we elaborate how a more positive valuation of conflict provides opportunities for mutual learning, the articulation of disagreement, and democratic modulation—three aspirations that are at the heart of most pTAs and consensus conferences. Disclosing the strengths and weaknesses of these different models is politically and epistemically useful, and should therefore be an integral part of the development of participation theory and process in science and technology.status: publishe

1 January 2013
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Book
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EWErik Weber
Erik Weber
JBJeroen Van Bouwel
Jeroen Van Bouwel
LVLeen De Vreese
Leen De Vreese

1 October 2002 in Economics and Philosophy
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EWErik Weber
Erik Weber
JBJeroen Van Bouwel
Jeroen Van Bouwel
Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level.The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism.This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.