Edwin Woerdman

Edwin Woerdman

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Edwin Woerdman

University of Groningen

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

27Years (2000-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 March 2009 in European Journal of Law and Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
EWE. Woerdman
E. Woerdman
OCO. Couwenberg
O. Couwenberg
ANA. Nentjes
A. Nentjes
The greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in the European Union primarily uses grandfathering until 2012, which means that polluters get emission rights free of charge based on their historical emissions. Energy consumers accuse energy producers of making windfall profits by incorporating the market value of those free rights into the energy prices. However, we develop a numerical example to illustrate that the reasoning of the producers is correct. We also explain why this market value is only partly passed on to consumers. We consider various measures and conclude that only auctioning the rights after 2012 nullifies the additional profits.

1 June 2014 in Energy Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TJThijs Jong
Thijs Jong
OCOscar Couwenberg
Oscar Couwenberg
EWEdwin Woerdman
Edwin Woerdman

1 August 2019 in Environmental Science & Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AVAviel Verbruggen
Aviel Verbruggen
ELErik Laes
Erik Laes
EWEdwin Woerdman
Edwin Woerdman

30 December 2008 in Review of Law & Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
EWEdwin Woerdman
Edwin Woerdman
AAAlessandra Arcuri
Alessandra Arcuri
SCStefano Clò
Stefano Clò
Emissions trading is becoming increasingly popular in environmental law. Allowances to trade emissions can either be auctioned off or handed out free of charge by means of grandfathering. Although grandfathering is frequently used in emissions trading schemes, it is a popular view in the economic and legal literature that grandfathering is inconsistent with the polluter-pays principle. We come to a different, more nuanced view. The question of whether polluters pay under grandfathering depends on how the polluter-pays principle is interpreted. We present a taxonomy of interpretations. Based on an efficiency interpretation of the principle, consistency is demonstrated by emphasizing the economic impact of the opportunity costs of gratis allowances and the lump sum nature of the subsidy that is inherent to grandfathering. Inconsistency can only be claimed based on an equity interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. Allocating allowances free of charge means that polluting firms receive a capital gift making their shareholders richer, which may be perceived as unfair. We draw two conclusions. First, contrary to what some have claimed, grandfathering is compatible with an efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. Second, only auctioning is consistent with an extended form of this principle. Auctioning ensures not only that pollution costs are internalized (efficiency), but also that producers buy their allowances before they pass on those costs to consumers (equity).


1 August 2001 in Ecological Economics
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Journal Article
Closed access
EWEdwin Woerdman
Edwin Woerdman