17 August 2010 in Religion, State and Society
Using data from the 1992, 1993 and 1994 surveys by the Ukrainian Research Institute on Youth Problems (Ukrains'kyi naukovo-doslidnyi instytut problem molodi), the 1999/2000 European Values Study, the 2008 International Social Survey Program, the 1997–1998 Aufbruch Survey and the opinion polls on religion carried out between 2000 and 2007 by the Razumkov Centre in Kiev this paper explores the nature, dynamic and peculiarities of religiosity in Ukraine since the fall of communism. It discusses the changes in religious convictions and denominational structure as well as correlation between religious behaviour and social and demographic characteristics. Survey data suggest that the changes in areas where religion has become a serious factor of national identity and of political and cultural mobilisation are even more obvious than changes in individual religiosity. The author argues that a notable feature of the new cultural climate in Ukraine is that religion has met with strong social approval and has become a sort of legitimising behaviour, the mark of a respectable citizen. Not only officials, politicians and public figures but also stars from the worlds of pop music and sport who are very popular among young people will emphasise that they belong to a church. Another feature of this climate is the special position of the church as a social institution and the creation of a type of religious culture that is deprived of strict denominational connotation. It is a faintly articulated set of symbols, signs, holidays, customs, practices and fragments of historical memory rather than a well-composed system of confessional belief.
1 January 2021 in Political Studies
KUKuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
It is a sort of truism in the social sciences that since the late 1970s the world has been witnessing the great return of religion into global politics and international relations. Paradigm shift in theorists’ concepts and practitioners’ perception of previously underestimated dimension were tremendously influenced by the chain of events signaled the new role of religion in politics, and among them by the explosive religious revival in countries where the Eastern Orthodoxy was the majority religion which started even well before the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia. Eastern Orthodoxy is the major religious denomination in 12 European countries, all but two of which (Greece and Cyprus) are former communist states. In this perspective , reasoning over Orthodoxy’s destiny is to greater extent reasoning over the post-communist political development as a phenomenon. Article proves that Eastern Orthodoxy provided post-communist states with symbolism and common ideological ground for both leftists and rightists, former communists and former dissenters, and extended a symbolic framework to the so-called Soviet people who lost the sense of belonging and were searching for their new identity. Orthodox Churches that saw itself and were widely perceived as the historic repository of nationhood, national values, and, quite often, as the savior of a nation's very existence, suggested itself as a main actor in the process of new identity building. Orthodoxy became the primary vehicle for the awakening of collective identity for the groups surrounded by or competed with groups of different religions. This trend was very clear in some of the episodes which marked the first postcommunist decade. Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the northern Caucasus and Transcaucasia were given a strong religious emphasis and religion was rapidly turned into the factor of political and national mobilization. At the same time, the aspiration of the newly independent states to gain the independence of their churches from Moscow and Belgrade has created an additional powerful geopolitical source of tension. While the process of bestowing Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine that met with fierce resistance from the Russian state, showed how far Russia could go to maintain ecclesiastical control over Ukraine. And also, what is the role of Orthodoxy as a symbolic and institutional resource in contemporary political processes. Key words: religion and politics, Eastern Orthodoxy, Post-Communist transformations
1 June 2008 in The Review of Faith & International Affairs
Over the first decade of independence, churches appeared as Ukraine's most trusted social institutions. Varied centers of religious power and a secular national history have provided Ukraine with a pluralistic, relatively free environment for religion. Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, and evangelical churches each address their own sectorof public opinion and their own corresponding circles of the political elite. Ukrainian unity splintered following the 2004 elections, and government relations with churches have been less harmonious. The U.S. can help Ukraine strengthen religious freedom by shaping elite and mass opinion through reports such as the annual International Religious Freedom Report.