1 January 2016 in Formation emploi
La « flexicurité » consiste à substituer d’autres formes de sécurité à celle de l’emploi, remise en cause par l’impératif de flexibilité. Notre étude de terrain montre que dans les Scop (sociétés coopératives et participatives), la logique est renversée ; la sécurité de l’emploi y est en effet prioritaire, la flexibilité provenant de modalités internes, ce qui nous amène à parler de « sécuflexibilité ». Ressortent alors de nos observations, les conditions fortes de cette voie originale et exigeante de conciliation de la sécurité de l’emploi avec la flexibilité, en particulier, la participation des salariés et leur responsabilisation.
12 September 2020 in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
2 October 2021 in Management & Organizational History
In « Dilemmas of Leadership in the Democratic Process», a little-known but thoughtful text, Chester Barnard promoted democratic governance in firms while making concessions for the difficulties that may arise in its implementation. It raises broader questions about Barnard’s thinking, particularly on the relationship between democracy and authority in the firm. Through this and other unknown texts, we show the coherence of Barnard’s thought, whose plea for democracy is nourished by an adherence to the project of individual emancipation. Authority is seen from an instrumental angle, as a complementary and necessary mode of decision-making to counter the ‘dilemmas’ of democracy as long as it is regulated. The same applies to the hierarchy on which authority relations are based which is not antagonistic to democracy, under certain conditions. Barnard’s postwar writings, focusing on responsibility, open up new avenues for the articulation between authority and democracy. In particular, the sense of responsibility spread at all levels that democratic governance encourages is also what can reduce the need for authority. This article aims to show that Barnard's thought, which does not see democracy and authority as oxymorons, remains relevant. Barnard can thus contribute to extending the perimeter of diffusion in democratic governance.
1 January 2012 in OEconomia
Hervé Charmettant et Julien Reysz ont réalisé cet entretien avec Olivier Favereau le 3 février 2012 à Paris. Olivier Favereau y retrace l’importance de Joseph Agassi pour le courant de l’école des conventions et parle de son actualité dans les débats actuels entre orthodoxie et hétérodoxie.
15 October 2024 in Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership
Purpose: This article presents a compelling case study of a workers’ cooperative in the cultural sector. It offers a unique opportunity to delve into the tensions between managerial and democratic control, particularly in the context of heightened artistic claims. The pivotal role of an accountant in management for nearly two decades sparks a thought-provoking question about the potential for cooperative degeneration.Design/methodology/approach: Our research employs a rigorous qualitative method, utilizing semi-structured interviews of six key members and a comprehensive analysis of legal, accounting and other media documents.Findings: Our findings offer a significant perspective, refuting any indications of organizational degeneration. The decision-making processes continue to uphold democratic principles. While the manager and his administrative staff wield substantial authority, this is justified by their duty to preserve the collective. This duty is executed under democratic control, facilitated by information transparency. The low level of democratic participation poses a challenge, but the manager’s initiatives are aimed at addressing this. The effectiveness of this control, however, relies on the active participation of the members, which acts as a strong deterrent against organizational degeneration.Originality/value: The originality of our contribution lies in our reference to Chester Barnard whose reflections on industrial democracy have been forgotten, reflections linked to his conception of managerial authority. We also highlight the importance of empowering individual members, which leads them to consider the consequences of their actions. As a result, the manager is not placed in a situation where he has to decide alone, as the scope of his unilateral powers is de facto delimited.
20 April 2020 in Droit et Société
Le déclin des entreprises « organisées » aux États-Unis semble signer la fin de l’espoir, ouvert par le Wagner Act et au cœur de l’ Industrial Pluralism , de rééquilibrer les pouvoirs intra-firme par la négociation collective entre l’employeur et les syndicats. Au moment où se développent en France les accords d’entreprise, il importe de revenir sur les raisons de cet espoir déçu afin d’en tirer les leçons. Nous montrons ainsi que c’est la dérive de la négociation vers un cadre purement contractuel qui a lié ses résultats à un rapport de forces dont l’évolution est devenue défavorable aux syndicats. Le second enseignement de notre analyse concerne les pouvoirs de gouvernance dont le maintien de leur détention exclusive par les dirigeants d’entreprise ne pouvait que conduire à l’échec de cette voie de rééquilibrage des pouvoirs.