Jennifer S. Trueblood

Jennifer S. Trueblood

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Jennifer S. Trueblood

Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2011 in Psychological Review
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Journal Article
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Jerome R BusemeyerJerome R Busemeyer
Jerome R Busemeyer
EPEmmanuel M. Pothos
Emmanuel M. Pothos
RFRiccardo Franco
Riccardo Franco
JTJennifer S. Trueblood
Jennifer S. Trueblood
A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment errors including the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, averaging effects, unpacking effects, and order effects on inference. On the one hand, quantum theory is similar to other categorization and memory models of cognition in that it relies on vector spaces defined by features and similarities between vectors to determine probability judgments. On the other hand, quantum probability theory is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory because it is based on a set of (von Neumann) axioms that relax some of the classic (Kolmogorov) axioms. The quantum model is compared and contrasted with other competing explanations for these judgment errors, including the anchoring and adjustment model for probability judgments. In the quantum model, a new fundamental concept in cognition is advanced--the compatibility versus incompatibility of questions and the effect this can have on the sequential order of judgments. We conclude that quantum information-processing principles provide a viable and promising new way to understand human judgment and reasoning.

22 April 2013 in Psychological Science
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JTJennifer S. Trueblood
Jennifer S. Trueblood
SBScott D. Brown
Scott D. Brown
AHAndrew Heathcote
Andrew Heathcote
Jerome R BusemeyerJerome R Busemeyer
Jerome R Busemeyer
Context effects—preference changes that depend on the availability of other options—have attracted a great deal of attention among consumer researchers studying high-level decision tasks. In the experiments reported here, we showed that these effects also arise in simple perceptual-decision-making tasks. This finding casts doubt on explanations limited to consumer choice and high-level decisions, and it indicates that context effects may be amenable to a general explanation at the level of the basic decision process. We demonstrated for the first time that three important context effects from the preferential-choice literature—similarity, attraction, and compromise effects—all occurred within a single perceptual-decision task. Not only do our results challenge previous explanations for context effects proposed by consumer researchers, but they also challenge the choice rules assumed in theories of perceptual decision making.

1 April 2014 in Psychological Review
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JTJennifer S. Trueblood
Jennifer S. Trueblood
SBScott D. Brown
Scott D. Brown
AHAndrew Heathcote
Andrew Heathcote
Context effects occur when a choice between 2 options is altered by adding a 3rd alternative. Three major context effects--similarity, compromise, and attraction--have wide-ranging implications across applied and theoretical domains, and have driven the development of new dynamic models of multiattribute and multialternative choice. We propose the multiattribute linear ballistic accumulator (MLBA), a new dynamic model that provides a quantitative account of all 3 context effects. Our account applies not only to traditional paradigms involving choices among hedonic stimuli, but also to recent demonstrations of context effects with nonhedonic stimuli. Because of its computational tractability, the MLBA model is more easily applied than previous dynamic models. We show that the model also accounts for a range of other phenomena in multiattribute, multialternative choice, including time pressure effects, and that it makes a new prediction about the relationship between deliberation time and the magnitude of the similarity effect, which we confirm experimentally.

26 September 2011 in Cognitive Science
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JTJennifer S. Trueblood
Jennifer S. Trueblood
Jerome R BusemeyerJerome R Busemeyer
Jerome R Busemeyer
Order of information plays a crucial role in the process of updating beliefs across time. In fact, the presence of order effects makes a classical or Bayesian approach to inference difficult. As a result, the existing models of inference, such as the belief-adjustment model, merely provide an ad hoc explanation for these effects. We postulate a quantum inference model for order effects based on the axiomatic principles of quantum probability theory. The quantum inference model explains order effects by transforming a state vector with different sequences of operators for different orderings of information. We demonstrate this process by fitting the quantum model to data collected in a medical diagnostic task and a jury decision-making task. To further test the quantum inference model, a new jury decision-making experiment is developed. Using the results of this experiment, we compare the quantum inference model with two versions of the belief-adjustment model, the adding model and the averaging model. We show that both the quantum model and the adding model provide good fits to the data. To distinguish the quantum model from the adding model, we develop a new experiment involving extreme evidence. The results from this new experiment suggest that the adding model faces limitations when accounting for tasks involving extreme evidence, whereas the quantum inference model does not. Ultimately, we argue that the quantum model provides a more coherent account for order effects that was not possible before.

1 March 2017 in Perspectives on Psychological Science
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SBS. Bouwmeester
S. Bouwmeester
PVP. P. J. L. Verkoeijen
P. P. J. L. Verkoeijen
BAB. Aczel
B. Aczel
FBFernando Barbosa
Fernando Barbosa
LBL. Bègue
L. Bègue
CWC. E. Wollbrant
C. E. Wollbrant
In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.

15 February 2018 in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
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GDGilles Dutilh
Gilles Dutilh
JAJeffrey Annis
Jeffrey Annis
SBScott D. Brown
Scott D. Brown
PCPeter Cassey
Peter Cassey
NENathan J. Evans
Nathan J. Evans
CDChris Donkin
Chris Donkin
Most data analyses rely on models. To complement statistical models, psychologists have developed cognitive models, which translate observed variables into