Pier Giuseppe Sessa

Pier Giuseppe Sessa

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Pier Giuseppe Sessa

D-ITET, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Svizzera Switzerland 8005

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 April 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
OKOrcun Karaca
Orcun Karaca
PSPier Giuseppe Sessa
Pier Giuseppe Sessa
NWNeil Walton
Neil Walton
MKMaryam Kamgarpour
Maryam Kamgarpour
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint sets. Our results are verified with several case studies based on electricity market data.

27 August 2018 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
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PSPier Giuseppe Sessa
Pier Giuseppe Sessa
DFDamian Frick
Damian Frick
TWTony A. Wood
Tony A. Wood
MKMaryam Kamgarpour
Maryam Kamgarpour
We consider the problem of synthesizing robust disturbance feedback policies for systems performing complex tasks. We formulate the tasks as linear temporal logic specifications and encode them into an optimization framework via mixed-integer constraints. Both the system dynamics and the specifications are known but affected by uncertainty. The distribution of the uncertainty is unknown, however realizations can be obtained. We introduce a data-driven approach where the constraints are fulfilled for a set of realizations and provide probabilistic generalization guarantees as a function of the number of considered realizations. We use separate chance constraints for the satisfaction of the specification and operational constraints. This allows us to quantify their violation probabilities independently. We compute disturbance feedback policies as solutions of mixed-integer linear or quadratic optimization problems. By using feedback we can exploit information of past realizations and provide feasibility for a wider range of situations compared to static input sequences. We demonstrate the proposed method on two robust motion-planning case studies for autonomous driving.

31 December 2018 in arXiv
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Preprint
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OKOrcun Karaca
Orcun Karaca
PSPier Giuseppe Sessa
Pier Giuseppe Sessa
NWNeil Walton
Neil Walton
MKMaryam Kamgarpour
Maryam Kamgarpour
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the constraint sets. Since calculating the payments directly for these mechanisms is computationally difficult for auctions involving many participants, we present two computationally efficient methods. Our results are verified with several case studies based on electricity market data.

24 October 2022 in arXiv
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Preprint
Open access
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AZAlessandro Zanardi
Alessandro Zanardi
PSPier Giuseppe Sessa
Pier Giuseppe Sessa
NKNando Käslin
Nando Käslin
SBSaverio Bolognani
Saverio Bolognani
ACAndrea Censi
Andrea Censi
EFEmilio Frazzoli
Emilio Frazzoli
We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most efficient equilibrium (in term of social cost) is often impractical from a computational standpoint, in this work we study the (in)efficiency of any equilibrium players might agree to play. More specifically, we bound the equilibrium inefficiency by modeling driving games as particular type of congestion games over spatio-temporal resources. We obtain novel guarantees that refine existing bounds on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) as a function of problem-dependent game parameters. For instance, the relative trade-off between proximity costs and personal objectives such as comfort and progress. Although the obtained guarantees concern open-loop trajectories, we observe efficient equilibria even when agents employ closed-loop policies trained via decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning.