1 August 2015 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
In this paper we analyze a dynamic game of Cournot competition with heterogeneous firms choosing between two different adaptive behavioral rules in deciding output strategies. The underlying oligopoly structure is standard: using a constant return to scale technology, N firms produce homogeneous goods, which are sold in a market characterized by constant price elasticity. In this setup, we assume that a fraction of firms employs a quite rough rule of thumb, the so-called Local Monopolistic Approximation (LMA), whereas the complementary fraction plays Best Reply (BR), a more demanding strategy in terms of information and computation requirements. The model is first considered with exogenously fixed fractions of firms in the two complementary groups. Then it is generalized by considering an endogenous evolutionary switching process between the two behavioral strategies based on profit-driven replicator dynamics. The role of the number of firms, information costs and inertia (or anchoring attitude) in production decisions is analyzed, as well as the influence in the evolutionary process of random noise in the demand function and memory of past profits. Global properties of the oligopoly with evolutionary pressure between behavioral rules are discussed, with particular regard to cases in which the Nash equilibrium is unstable
20 February 2022 in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
29 February 2008 in International Journal of Systems Science
In this article, single product Cournot oligopolies are considered, where the demand and cost functions are linear. While cost functions are completely known by all firms, they only partially know the demand function, as they misspecify the slope. At any stage of the repeated oligopoly game firms update the slope of their subjective demand functions on the basis of the discrepancy they observe between the expected price, computed according to believed demand, and the price they actually observe. This adjustment process has a unique steady state, where any subjective demand function coincides with the true demand function. If such steady state is stable, then the true slope of the demand function can be learned by all oligopolists, even if they start from misspecified initial guesses. Sufficient conditions for the stability of the steady state are given for n-firms oligopolies. In the particular case of a duopoly, an exact delimitation of the stability region in the parameters’ space is given, and with the help of numerical simulations, the size and the shape of the basins of attraction is analysed, as well as the kinds of attracting sets that characterise the long-run dynamics of the learning process when the steady state is unstable.
1 January 2000 in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
In this paper the problem of chaos synchronization, and the related phenomena of riddling, blowout and onoff intermittency, are considered for discrete time competition models with identical competitors. The global properties which determine the different effects of riddling and blowout bifurcations are studied by the method of critical curves, a tool for the study of the global dynamical properties of two-dimensional noninvertible maps. These techniques are applied to the study of a dynamic market-share competition model.
31 January 2014 in Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation
1 January 2009 in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Binary choice games with externalities, as those described by Schelling (1973, 1978), have been recently modelled as discrete dynamical systems (Bischi and Merlone, 2009). In this paper we discuss the dynamic behavior in the case in which agents are impulsive; that is; they decide to switch their choices even when the difference between payoffs is extremely small. This particular case can be seen as a limiting case of the original model and can be formalized as a piecewise linear discontinuous map. We analyze the dynamic behavior of this map, characterized by the presence of stable periodic cycles of any period that appear and disappear through border‐collision bifurcations. After a numerical exploration, we study the conditions for the creation and the destruction of periodic cycles, as well as the analytic expressions of the bifurcation curves.