Joshua C. Yang

Joshua C. Yang

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Joshua C. Yang

ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 October 2024 in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JYJoshua C. Yang
Joshua C. Yang
DDDamian Dailisan
Damian Dailisan
MKMarcin Korecki
Marcin Korecki
CHCarina Ines Hausladen
Carina Ines Hausladen
DHDirk Helbing
Dirk Helbing
This paper investigates the voting behaviors of Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically GPT-4 and LLaMA-2, their biases, and how they align with human voting patterns. Our methodology involved using a dataset from a human voting experiment to establish a baseline for human preferences and conducting a corresponding experiment with LLM agents. We observed that the choice of voting methods and the presentation order influenced LLM voting outcomes. We found that varying the persona can reduce some of these biases and enhance alignment with human choices. While the Chain-of-Thought approach did not improve prediction accuracy, it has potential for AI explainability in the voting process. We also identified a trade-off between preference diversity and alignment accuracy in LLMs, influenced by different temperature settings. Our findings indicate that LLMs may lead to less diverse collective outcomes and biased assumptions when used in voting scenarios, emphasizing the need for cautious integration of LLMs into democratic processes.

13 September 2024 in Digital Government: Research and Practice
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JYJoshua C. Yang
Joshua C. Yang
CHCarina Ines Hausladen
Carina Ines Hausladen
DPDominik Peters
Dominik Peters
Evangelos PournarasEvangelos Pournaras
Evangelos Pournaras
RHRegula Hänggli
Regula Hänggli
DHDirk Helbing
Dirk Helbing
Participatory Budgeting (PB) has evolved into a key democratic instrument for resource allocation in cities. Enabled by digital platforms, cities now have the opportunity to let citizens directly propose and vote on urban projects, using different voting input and aggregation rules. However, the choices cities make in terms of the rules of their PB have often not been informed by academic studies on voter behaviour and preferences. Therefore, this work presents the results of behavioural experiments where participants were asked to vote in a fictional PB setting. We identified approaches to designing PB voting that minimise cognitive load and enhance the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the digital process from the citizens’ perspective. In our study, participants preferred voting input formats that are more expressive (like rankings and distributing points) over simpler formats (like approval voting). Participants also indicated a desire for the budget to be fairly distributed across city districts and project categories. Participants found the Method of Equal Shares voting rule to be fairer than the conventional Greedy voting rule. These findings offer actionable insights for digital governance, contributing to the development of fairer and more transparent digital systems and collective decision-making processes for citizens.


21 March 2024 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
JYJoshua C. Yang
Joshua C. Yang
CHCarina Ines Hausladen
Carina Ines Hausladen
DPDominik Peters
Dominik Peters
Evangelos PournarasEvangelos Pournaras
Evangelos Pournaras
RHRegula Hänggli
Regula Hänggli
DHDirk Helbing
Dirk Helbing
Participatory Budgeting (PB) has evolved into a key democratic instrument for resource allocation in cities. Enabled by digital platforms, cities now have the opportunity to let citizens directly propose and vote on urban projects, using different voting input and aggregation rules. However, the choices cities make in terms of the rules of their PB have often not been informed by academic studies on voter behaviour and preferences. Therefore, this work presents the results of behavioural experiments where participants were asked to vote in a fictional PB setting. We identified approaches to designing PB voting that minimise cognitive load and enhance the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the digital process from the citizens' perspective. In our study, participants preferred voting input formats that are more expressive (like rankings and distributing points) over simpler formats (like approval voting). Participants also indicated a desire for the budget to be fairly distributed across city districts and project categories. Participants found the Method of Equal Shares voting rule to be fairer than the conventional Greedy voting rule. These findings offer actionable insights for digital governance, contributing to the development of fairer and more transparent digital systems and collective decision-making processes for citizens.

13 April 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JYJoshua C. Yang
Joshua C. Yang
NSNoemi Scheurer
Noemi Scheurer
DHDirk Helbing
Dirk Helbing
Public funding processes demand fairness, learning, and outcomes that participants can understand. We introduce Komitee Equal Shares, a priceable virtual-budget allocation framework that integrates two signals: in voter mode, participants cast point votes; in evaluator mode, small groups assess proposals against collectively defined impact fields. The framework extends the Method of Equal Shares by translating both signals into virtual spending power and producing explicit “voting receipts.” We deployed the framework in the 2025 Kultur Komitee in Winterthur, Switzerland (N = 38), allocating CHF 380,000. Our results show that this hybrid approach generates a more diverse portfolio than simple aggregation and that participants value the fair process over individual control. The framework offers a model where citizens act as both voters and evaluators within a single, proportional, and explainable allocation.

2 October 2025 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
JYJoshua C. Yang
Joshua C. Yang
NSNoemi Scheurer
Noemi Scheurer
Public funding processes demand fairness, learning, and outcomes that participants can understand. We introduce Komitee Equal Shares, a priceable virtual-budget allocation framework that integrates two signals: in voter mode, participants cast point votes; in evaluator mode, small groups assess proposals against collectively defined impact fields. The framework extends the Method of Equal Shares by translating both signals into virtual spending power and producing voting receipts. We deployed the framework in the 2025 Kultur Komitee in Winterthur, Switzerland. Our contributions are: (1) a clear separation of decision modes, addressing a gap in social choice that typically treats participatory budgeting as preference aggregation while citizens also see themselves as evaluators; and (2) the design of voting receipts that operationalise priceability into participant-facing explanations, making proportional allocations legible and traceable. The framework generalises to participatory grant-making and budgeting, offering a model where citizens act as voters and evaluators within one proportional, explainable allocation.