DICE is a Trusted Computing standard intended to secure resource-constrained off-the-shelf hardware. It implements a Root of Trust that can be used to construct a Chain of Trust boot system, with symmetric keys representing firmware integrity and device identity. Based on this, asymmetric keys can be generated, but this slows down the boot process significantly as the keys need to be generated on every boot. Asymmetric keys provide multiple advantages when compared to symmetric ones, especially for updateable systems. This prevents the adoption of DICE in fields with strict boot time requirements, for example in the automotive context. Boot times can be accelerated if keys can be cached in flash memory. However, keys must not be accessible if the state of the system changes, as otherwise the keys would not represent the state anymore. We implement two approaches for this and evaluate them on three MCUs regarding automotive requirements, with representatives for low-level, mid-level and hardware-accelerated controllers.
Cyber resiliency has been gaining traction as a transdisciplinary approach to cyber-physical system safety and security. Apart from its inherent complexity, the discipline is relatively immature, its current form being abstract descriptions of organizational and managerial aspects revolving around the design of cyber resilient systems. The concept of Autonomous Intelligent Agents for cyber resiliency has been theorized and shows promise towards developing mission aware autonomous defenders. This paper presents our educated opinions on the subject and theorize about the conceptual design of Autonomous Resiliency Agents.