Niu Yu

Niu Yu

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Niu Yu

School of Management, Wuhan textile University, Wuhan, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 July 2021 in Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
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BZBenrong Zheng
Benrong Zheng
NYNiu Yu
Niu Yu
Jie ChuJie Chu
Jie Chu

1 March 2017 in Naval Research Logistics (NRL)
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Journal Article
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JLJianbin Li
Jianbin Li
NYNiu Yu
Niu Yu
ZLZhixin Liu
Zhixin Liu
XCXueyuan Cai
Xueyuan Cai

10 January 2025 in Operational Research
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Journal Article
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NYNiu Yu
Niu Yu
MXMengni Xiong
Mengni Xiong
PZPin Zhou
Pin Zhou
QBQingguo Bai
Qingguo Bai

1 January 2021 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
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Journal Article
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QBQingguo Bai
Qingguo Bai
JXJianteng Xu
Jianteng Xu
FMFanwen Meng
Fanwen Meng
NYNiu Yu
Niu Yu
This paper incorporates carbon emission regulation and cost learning effects to examine a manufacturer-retailer supply chain for deteriorating items over a multi-period planning horizon. We investigate their impacts on supply chain coordination under the assumption that the product demand is affected by the selling price, promotional effort and inventory level. We first propose two algorithms for determining optimal solutions of the centralized and decentralized models. We show that the decentralized system can be coordinated perfectly with a two-part tariff contract. Further, we study necessary conditions under which members of the supply chain can accept this contract. At last, we conduct numerical experiment to illustrate the obtained theoretical results in impact analysis and the robustness of the coordinated model.

1 January 2025 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
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Journal Article
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NYNiu Yu
Niu Yu
MZMinghui Zhao
Minghui Zhao
HZHaibo Zhou
Haibo Zhou
ZJZhiqiang Jiao
Zhiqiang Jiao
To realize the "dual carbon" goal, governments around the world (e.g., China) have been implementing subsidy and dual credit policies to promote the adoption of new energy vehicles (NEVs). The traditional automakers who sell fuel vehicles (FVs) should consider how to obtain sufficient NEV credits to reach the carbon emission standard. However, direct producing NEVs is often costly and facing uncertainty. In this work, we develop a game-theoretical model to analyze two credit strategies: (ⅰ) Mode P: Purchasing NEV credits or (ⅱ) Mode R: Reselling NEVs. Our results indicate that when the credit trading price is relatively low, the selling price of FVs under mode R is higher than under mode P, while the FV automaker sells more FVs under mode P than under mode R. Additionally, Mode R leads to an increase in the total sales volume for the FV automaker. As a result, the FV automaker's profit under mode R is always higher than under mode P. We also compare the performance of the NEV automaker under both modes. The results show that when the operating cost of NEVs is low and the credit trading price is moderate, the NEV automaker achieves higher profits under mode P.

14 August 2025 in Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
NYNiu Yu
Niu Yu
ZZZhaoyuan Zhang
Zhaoyuan Zhang
XCXueyuan Cai
Xueyuan Cai