1 February 2020 in Computers & Security
8 October 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Recent incidents such as the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack and the SolarWinds hack have shown that traditional defense techniques are becoming insufficient to deter adversaries of growing sophistication. Proactive and deceptive defenses are an emerging class of methods to defend against zero-day and advanced attacks. This work develops a new game-theoretic framework called the duplicity game to design deception mechanisms that consist of a generator, an incentive modulator, and a trust manipulator, referred to as the GMM mechanism. We formulate a mathematical programming problem to compute the optimal GMM mechanism, quantify the upper limit of enforceable security policies, and characterize conditions on user’s identifiability and manageability for cyber attribution and user management. We develop a separation principle that decouples the design of the modulator from the GMM mechanism and an equivalence principle that turns the joint design of the generator and the manipulator into the single design of the manipulator. A case study of dynamic honeypot configurations is presented to mitigate insider threats. The numerical experiments corroborate the results that the optimal GMM mechanism can elicit desirable actions from both selfish and adversarial insiders and consequently improve the security posture of the insider network. In particular, a proper modulator can reduce the incentive misalignment between the players and achieve win-win situations for the selfish insider and the defender. Meanwhile, we observe that the defender always benefits from faking the percentage of honeypots when the optimal generator is presented.
7 July 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Attacks exploiting the innate and the acquired vulnerabilities of human users have posed severe threats to cybersecurity. This work proposes ADVERT, a human-technical solution that generates adaptive visual aids in real-time to prevent users from inadvertence and reduce their susceptibility to phishing attacks. Based on the eye-tracking data, we extract visual states and attention states as system-level sufficient statistics to characterize the user’s visual behaviors and attention status. By adopting a data-driven approach and two learning feedback of different time scales, this work lays out a theoretical foundation to analyze , evaluate , and particularly modify humans’ attention processes while they vet and recognize phishing emails. We corroborate the effectiveness , efficiency , and robustness of ADVERT through a case study based on the data set collected from human subject experiments conducted at New York University. The results show that the visual aids can statistically increase the attention level and improve the accuracy of phishing recognition from 74.6% to a minimum of 86%. The meta-adaptation can further improve the accuracy to 91.5% (resp. 93.7%) in less than 3 (resp. 50) tuning stages.
26 July 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering
This article studies rational and persistent deception among intelligent robots to enhance security and operational efficiency. We present an $N$ -player $K$ -stage game with an asymmetric information structure where each robot’s private information is modeled as a random variable or its type. The deception is persistent as each robot’s private type remains unknown to other robots for all stages. The deception is rational as robots aim to achieve their deception goals at minimum cost. Each robot forms a dynamic belief of others’ types based on intrinsic or extrinsic information. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) is a natural solution concept for dynamic games of incomplete information. Due to its requirements of sequential rationality and belief consistency, PBNE provides a reliable prediction of players’ actions, beliefs, and expected cumulative costs over the entire $K$ stages. The contribution of this work is fourfold. First, we identify the PBNE computation as a nonlinear stochastic control problem and characterize the structures of players’ actions and costs under PBNE. We further derive a set of extended Riccati equations with cognitive coupling under the linear-quadratic (LQ) setting and extrinsic belief dynamics. Second, we develop a receding-horizon algorithm with low temporal and spatial complexity to compute PBNE under intrinsic belief dynamics. Third, we investigate a deceptive pursuit-evasion game as a case study and use numerical experiments to corroborate the results. Finally, we propose metrics, such as deceivability, reachability, and the price of deception (PoD), to evaluate the strategy design and the system performance under deception. Note to Practitioners—Recent advances in automation and adaptive control in multi-agent systems enable robots to use deception to accomplish their objectives. Deception involves intentional information hiding to compromise the security and operational efficiency of the robotic systems. This work proposes a dynamic game framework to quantify the impact of deception, understand the robots’ behaviors and intentions, and design cost-efficient strategies under the deception that persists over stages. Existing research studies on robot deception have relied on experiments while this work aims to lay a theoretical foundation of deception with quantitative metrics, such as deceivability and the PoD. The proposed model has wide applications, including cooperative robots, pursuit and evasion, and human–robot teaming. The pursuit-evasion games are used as case studies to show how the deceiver can amplify the deception by belief manipulation and how the deceived robots can reduce the negative impact of deception by enhanced maneuverability and Bayesian learning. The future work would focus on designing cooperative deception among swarm robotics and robotic systems that are robust to or further benefit from the deception.