11 January 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Fingerprint embedding at the physical layer is a highly tunable authentication framework for wireless communication that achieves information-theoretic security by hiding a traditional HMAC tag in noise. In a multiantenna scenario, artificial noise (AN) can be transmitted to obscure the tag even further. The AN strategy, however, relies on perfect knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) between the legitimate users. When the CSI is not perfectly known, the added noise leaks into the receiver's observations. In this article, we explore whether AN still improves security in the fingerprint embedding authentication framework with only imperfect CSI available at the transmitter and receiver. Specifically, we discuss and design detectors that account for AN leakage and analyze the adversary's ability to recover the key from observed transmissions. We compare the detection and security performance of the optimal perfect CSI detector with the imperfect CSI robust matched filter test and a generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT). We find that utilizing AN can greatly improve security, but suffers from diminishing returns when the quality of CSI knowledge is poor. In fact, we find that in some cases allocating additional power to AN can begin to decrease key security.
23 June 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
This paper investigates the secret-key-authenticated-capacity region, where information-theoretic authentication is defined by the ability of the decoder to accept and decode messages originating from a valid encoder while rejecting messages from other invalid sources. The model considered here consists of a valid encoder-decoder pairing that can communicate through a channel controlled by an adversary who is also able to eavesdrop on the encoder’s transmissions. Over multiple rounds of communication, the adversary first decides whether or not to replace the decoder’s observation with an arbitrary one of the adversary’s choosing, with the goal of the adversary being to have the decoder accept and decode their observation as a valid message (different from that of the encoder). To combat the adversary, the encoder and decoder share a secret key. The secret-key-authenticated-capacity region here is then defined as the region of jointly achievable message rate, authentication rate (a to be defined per symbol measure that will generally represent the likelihood that an adversary can fool the decoder), and the key-consumption rate (how many bits of secret key are needed per symbol sent). This is the first of a two-part study, with the parts differing in their measure of the authentication rate. In this first study, the authentication rate is the exponent of blocklength-normalized exponent of the expected probability of false authentication. For this metric, we provide an inner bound which improves on those existing in the literature. This is achieved by adopting and merging different classical techniques in novel ways. Within these classical secret-key-based authentication techniques, one technique derives authentication capability from secure channel coding to send the secret key with the message, and the other technique derives its authentication capability directly from obscuring the source.
27 June 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
This paper investigates the secret key-authenticated-capacity region, where information-theoretic authentication is defined by the ability of the decoder to accept and decode messages originating from a valid encoder while rejecting messages from other invalid sources. The model considered here consists of a valid encoder-decoder pairing that can communicate through a channel controlled by an adversary who is also able to eavesdrop on the encoder’s transmissions. Prior to the encoder’s transmission, the adversary decides whether or not to replace the decoder’s observation with an arbitrary one of the adversary’s choosing, with the adversary’s objective being to have the decoder accept and decode their observation to a valid message (different from that of the encoder). To combat the adversary, the encoder and decoder share a secret key. The secret key-authenticated-capacity region is defined as the region of jointly achievable message rate, authentication rate (a to be defined per symbol measure that will generally represent the likelihood that an adversary can fool the decoder), and the key-consumption rate (how many bits of secret key are needed per symbol sent). This is the second of a two-part study, with the parts differing in their measure of the authentication rate. For this second study, the probability of false authentication is considered as a function of the system state, where the system state is defined by the message being transmitted, the value of the secret key, the adversary’s channel observations, and the adversary’s (possibly stochastic) choice for the decoder’s observation. Termed the typical-authentication rate, the authentication measure considered here corresponds to an upper bound on the probability of false authentication for the majority of system states. For this measure, we derive matching inner and outer bounds for the secret key-enabled authenticated capacity region in terms of traditional information-theoretic measures. In doing so, it is shown that the typical-authentication rate and the message rate exhibit a one-to-one trade-off in the capacity region.
12 September 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
This work establishes that the physical layer can be used to perform information-theoretic authentication in additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, as long as the adversary is not omniscient. The model considered consists of an encoder, decoder, and adversary, where the adversary knows the message given to the encoder, has a non-causal noisy observation of the encoder’s transmission and may use unlimited transmission power, while the decoder observes a noisy version of the sum of the encoder and adversary’s outputs. A method to modify a generic existing channel code to enable authentication is presented. This method relies on injecting message-dependent noise into the transmission and accepting the transmission as authentic only if the correct noise levels for the decoded message are observed. One drawback to this method is that the encoder must still transmit a low-power signal in the case where there is no message to send. It is shown that this modification costs an asymptotically negligible amount of the coding rate, while still enabling authentication as long as the adversary’s observation is not noiseless. Also notable is that this modification is not (asymptotically) a function of the statistical characterization of the adversary’s channel and no secret key is required. We believe these features will pave the way for a robust practical implementation. Using these results, the channel-authenticated capacity is calculated and shown to be equal to the non-adversarial channel capacity. As our results will show, information-theoretic authentication in AWGN channels is possible without the need for the legitimate party to have a model-based advantage over the adversary. While this modular scheme is designed for use in the given channel model, it is applicable to a wide range of settings.