Giovanni Cherubin

Giovanni Cherubin

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Giovanni Cherubin

Royal Holloway University of London

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 April 2017 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GCGiovanni Cherubin
Giovanni Cherubin
JHJamie Hayes
Jamie Hayes
MJMarc Juarez
Marc Juarez
Website Fingerprinting (WF) allows a passive network adversary to learn the websites that a client visits by analyzing traffic patterns that are unique to each website. It has been recently shown that these attacks are particularly effective against .onion sites, anonymous web servers hosted within the Tor network. Given the sensitive nature of the content of these services, the implications of WF on the Tor network are alarming. Prior work has only considered defenses at the client-side arguing that web servers lack of incentives to adopt countermeasures. Furthermore, most of these defenses have been designed to operate on the stream of network packets, making practical deployment difficult. In this paper, we propose two application-level defenses including the first server-side defense against WF, as .onion services have incentives to support it. The other defense is a lightweight client-side defense implemented as a browser add-on, improving ease of deployment over previous approaches. In our evaluations, the server-side defense is able to reduce WF accuracy on Tor .onion sites from 69.6% to 10% and the client-side defense reduces accuracy from 64% to 31.5%.

31 August 2018 in Machine Learning
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GCGiovanni Cherubin
Giovanni Cherubin
We study majority vote ensembles of \(\varepsilon \)-valid conformal predictors (CP). We show that the prediction set \(\varGamma ^\eta \) produced as the majority vote among the prediction sets \(\varGamma ^\varepsilon _i\) of k independent \(\varepsilon \)-valid CPs is also valid, for some significance level \(\eta \); we provide a method to compute \(\varepsilon \) to achieve a desired \(\eta \). We further indicate an error upper bound for an ensemble of correlated CPs, and derive a value \(\varepsilon \) for which such an ensemble guarantees \(\eta \) conservative validity. We evaluate empirically our findings, and compare them with alternative strategies for combining CPs’ predictions.

1 October 2017 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GCGiovanni Cherubin
Giovanni Cherubin
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks raise major concerns about users’ privacy. They employ Machine Learning (ML) techniques to allow a local passive adversary to uncover the Web browsing behavior of a user, even if she browses through an encrypted tunnel (e.g. Tor, VPN). Numerous defenses have been proposed in the past; however, it is typically difficult to have formal guarantees on their security, which is most often evaluated empirically against state-of-the-art attacks. In this paper, we present a practical method to derive security bounds for any WF defense, where the bounds depend on a chosen feature set. This result derives from reducing WF attacks to an ML classification task, where we can determine the smallest achievable error (the Bayes error). Such error can be estimated in practice, and is a lower bound for a WF adversary, for any classification algorithm he may use. Our work has two main consequences: i) it allows determining the security of WF defenses, in a black-box manner, with respect to the state-of-the-art feature set and ii) it favors shifting the focus of future WF research to identifying optimal feature sets. The generality of this approach further suggests that the method could be used to define security bounds for other ML-based attacks.

1 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
KCKonstantinos Chatzikokolakis
Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis
GCGiovanni Cherubin
Giovanni Cherubin
Catuscia PalamidessiCatuscia Palamidessi
Catuscia Palamidessi
CTCarmela Troncoso
Carmela Troncoso
Security system designers favor worst-case security metrics, such as those derived from differential privacy (DP), due to the strong guarantees they provide. On the downside, these guarantees result in a high penalty on the system's performance. In this paper, we study Bayes security, a security metric inspired by the cryptographic advantage. Similarly to DP, Bayes security i) is independent of an adversary's prior knowledge, ii) it captures the worst-case scenario for the two most vulnerable secrets (e.g., data records); and iii) it is easy to compose, facilitating security analyses. Additionally, Bayes security iv) can be consistently estimated in a black-box manner, contrary to DP, which is useful when a formal analysis is not feasible; and v) provides a better utility-security trade-off in high-security regimes because it quantifies the risk for a specific threat model as opposed to threat-agnostic metrics such as DP. We formulate a theory around Bayes security, and we provide a thorough comparison with respect to well-known metrics, identifying the scenarios where Bayes Security is advantageous for designers.

3 April 2015
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
GCGiovanni Cherubin
Giovanni Cherubin
INIlia Nouretdinov
Ilia Nouretdinov
AGAlexander Gammerman
Alexander Gammerman
RJRoberto Jordaney
Roberto Jordaney
ZWZhi Wang
Zhi Wang
LCLorenzo Cavallaro
Lorenzo Cavallaro

17 April 2016
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
GCGiovanni Cherubin
Giovanni Cherubin
INIlia Nouretdinov
Ilia Nouretdinov