Michael Jaemin Kim

Michael Jaemin Kim

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Michael Jaemin Kim

Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JPJaehyun Park
Jaehyun Park
JCJaewan Choi
Jaewan Choi
KKKwanhee Kyung
Kwanhee Kyung
MKMichael Jaemin Kim
Michael Jaemin Kim
YKYongsuk Kwon
Yongsuk Kwon
JAJung Ho Ahn
Jung Ho Ahn

30 March 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
YSYan Sun
Yan Sun
JKJongyul Kim
Jongyul Kim
ZYZeduo Yu
Zeduo Yu
JZJiyuan Zhang
Jiyuan Zhang
SCSiyuan Chai
Siyuan Chai
NKNam Sung Kim
Nam Sung Kim

30 March 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SBSeungmin Baek
Seungmin Baek
MWMinbok Wi
Minbok Wi
SPSeonyong Park
Seonyong Park
HNHwayong Nam
Hwayong Nam
MKMichael Jaemin Kim
Michael Jaemin Kim
JAJung Ho Ahn
Jung Ho Ahn
A body of recent work has revealed that two different rows in a DRAM bank, from the perspective of a processor-memory interface, are connected to the same wordline but two separate row buffers (bitline sense amplifiers) in certain DRAM chips. Such a pair of rows is referred to as a ''coupled-row pair.'' Coupled-row pairs pose a substantial security threat as RowHammer bitflips can be caused not only by the conventional, adjacent aggressor rows but also by their coupled rows that are distant in physical address We investigate the impact of a coupled row on both FPGA-based infrastructure and server systems. In RowHammer attacks, coupled rows have hammering strength nearly identical to aggressor rows, with these attacks invisible to conventional, processor-side mitigation solutions. By exploiting these observations, we present Marionette, a new type of RowHammer attack that exploits coupled rows to extend the existing RowHammer attack surface. First, coupled rows enable an attacker to evade two types of existing software-based RowHammer defenses: tracking- and isolation-based defenses. We induce RowHammer bitflips successfully against tracking-based RowHammer defenses by silently hammering coupled rows. We also identify the feasibility of RowHammer bitflips in an isolation-based inter-VM RowHammer defense by breaking DRAM-subarray-level isolation. Second, we successfully conduct an existing RowHammer exploit in a server under the tracking-based RowHammer defense. In a native server system, Marionette enhances the success rate of the RowHammer exploit by up to 1.66x. Lastly, we explore lightweight mitigation schemes for Marionette by exposing the coupled-row relationship to systems.

28 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MKMichael Jaemin Kim
Michael Jaemin Kim
MWMinbok Wi
Minbok Wi
JPJaehyun Park
Jaehyun Park
SKSeoyoung Ko
Seoyoung Ko
JCJaeyoung Choi
Jaeyoung Choi
ELEojin Lee
Eojin Lee
Error-correcting code (ECC) has been widely used in DRAM-based memory systems to address the exacerbating random errors following the fabrication process scaling. However, ECCs including the strong form of Chipkill have not been so effective against Row Hammer (RH), which incurs bursts of errors discretely corrupting the whole row beyond the ECC correction capability. We propose Cube, a novel chip-wise physical to DRAM address randomization scheme that leverages the abundant detection capability of on-die-ECC (OECC) and correction capability of Chipkill against RH. Cube allows for synergistic cooperation between ECC, probabilistic RH-protection schemes, and the system with minimal to no modification for each. First, Cube scrambles the rows of each chip using a boot-time key in a way that distributes RH victims to multiple Chipkill codewords. Second, Cube utilizes the newly observed distinct RH error characteristics from real DRAM chips, to swiftly diagnose the RH victim rows using the error profile from OECC scrubbing, and even correct it leveraging Chipkill. When combined, Cube decreases the failure probability of PARA and a state-of-the-art RH protection scheme SRS by up to 10− 25. At a target failure probability of 10− 10 per year on a DDR5 rank under the RH threshold of 2K, Cube reduces the performance and table size overhead of SRS by up to 24.3% and 39.9%, respectively.

17 July 2023 in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HNHwayong Nam
Hwayong Nam
SBSeungmin Baek
Seungmin Baek
MWMinbok Wi
Minbok Wi
MKMichael Jaemin Kim
Michael Jaemin Kim
JPJaehyun Park
Jaehyun Park
JAJung Ho Ahn
Jung Ho Ahn
The demand for accurate information about the internal structure and characteristics of dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) has been on the rise. Recent studies have explored the structure and characteristics of DRAM to improve processing in memory, enhance reliability, and mitigate a vulnerability known as rowhammer. However, DRAM manufacturers only disclose limited information through official documents, making it difficult to find specific information about actual DRAM devices. This paper presents reliable findings on the internal structure and characteristics of DRAM using activate-induced bitflips (AIBs), retention time test, and row-copy operation. While previous studies have attempted to understand the internal behaviors of DRAM devices, they have only shown results without identifying the causes or have analyzed DRAM modules rather than individual chips. We first uncover the size, structure, and operation of DRAM subarrays and verify our findings on the characteristics of DRAM. Then, we correct misunderstood information related to AIBs and demonstrate experimental results supporting the cause of rowhammer. We expect that the information we uncover about the structure, behavior, and characteristics of DRAM will help future DRAM research.

27 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
CSChihun Song
Chihun Song
MKMichael Jaemin Kim
Michael Jaemin Kim
TWTianchen Wang
Tianchen Wang
HJHouxiang Ji
Houxiang Ji
JHJinghan Huang
Jinghan Huang
NKNam Sung Kim
Nam Sung Kim
Row Hammer (RH) has been demonstrated as a security vulnerability in modern systems. Although commodity CPUs can handle RH-induced single-bit errors in DRAM through ECC, RH can still give rise to multi-bit uncorrectable errors (UEs) and crash the systems. Meanwhile, recent work has indicated that the DRAM cells vulnerable to RH are determined by manufacturing imperfections and resulting defects. Taking one step further from the recent work, we first conduct RH experiments on contemporary DRAM modules for 3 weeks. This demonstrates that RH-induced UEs occur only at specific DRAM addresses (RH-UE-vulnerable addresses) and the percentage of such addresses is small in these DRAM modules. Second, to protect the systems from RH-induced UEs, we propose two RH defense solutions: H- and S-TAROT (TArgeted ROw-Hammer Therapy). H-TAROT is a software-based solution running on the host CPU. It obtains RH-UE-vulnerable addresses during the system boot and then periodically accesses such addresses before UEs may occur. Since it accesses only a small percentage of addresses, it does not incur a notable performance penalty for throughput applications (e.g., a 1.5% increase in execution time of the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite running on a system even with 128GB of DRAM). Yet, it imposes a significant performance penalty on latency-sensitive applications (e.g., a 28.2% increase in tail latency of Redis). To minimize the performance penalty, for a system with a SmartNIC (SNIC), S-TAROT offloads H-TAROT from the host CPU to the SNIC CPU. Our experiment shows that S-TAROT increases the execution time and tail latency of the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite and Redis by only 0.1% and 1.0%, respectively.