Liming Liu

Liming Liu

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Liming Liu

Faculty of Business, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

31Years (1996-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2007 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LLLiming Liu
Liming Liu
MPMahmut Parlar
Mahmut Parlar
SZStuart X. Zhu
Stuart X. Zhu
This paper studies a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer facing price- and lead-time-sensitive demands. A Stackelberg game is constructed to analyze the price and lead time decisions by the supplier as the leader and the retailer as the follower. The equilibrium strategies of the two players are obtained. Using the performance of the corresponding centralized system as a benchmark, we show that decentralized decisions in general are inefficient and lead to inferior performance due to the double marginalization effect. However, further analysis shows that the decision inefficiency is strongly influenced by market and operational factors, and if the operational factors are dominating, it may not be significant. This shows that before pursuing a coordination strategy with retailers, a supplier should first improve his or her own internal operations.

1 January 2012 in Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MLMeifeng Luo
Meifeng Luo
LLLiming Liu
Liming Liu
FGFei Gao
Fei Gao

1 March 2011 in Management Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
WSWeixin Shang
Weixin Shang
LLLiming Liu
Liming Liu
We investigate firms' competitive behaviors in industries where customers are sensitive to both promised delivery time (PDT) and quality of service (QoS) measured by the on-time delivery rate. To study the competition in PDT at the marketing level, we construct an oligopoly game with an external QoS requirement. We show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium QoS exhibits a switching surface structure with respect to capacities. To study the competition in capacity at the strategic level, we construct a two-stage game in which the firms compete in terms of their capacities in stage 1 and in terms of PDT in stage 2. We show the existence of two different types of pure strategy equilibria and characterize them. This study provides the following insights: an index of time-based competitive advantage (ITCA) and the first-mover advantage determine the positions of the firms in time-based competition; either the well-known prisoner's dilemma or off-equilibrium behaviors due to different preferences for equilibria (when multiple equilibria exist) may lead the firms to overinvest in capacity, but no one may gain a competitive advantage; a uniform improvement in internal efficiency (i.e., a uniform capacity cost reduction) may harm everyone; quality differentiation (i.e., going beyond the QoS benchmark) plays a dual role in time-based competition, either helping a firm with a larger ITCA to compete more effectively, or helping a firm possibly with a smaller ITCA to preempt competitors and protect its market advantage. This paper was accepted by Paul H. Zipkin, operations and supply chain management.

1 April 2013 in Journal of Transport Geography
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Journal Article
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LLLiming Liu
Liming Liu
KWKelly Yujie Wang
Kelly Yujie Wang
Tsz Leung YIPTsz Leung YIP
Tsz Leung YIP

4 December 2009 in Maritime Policy & Management
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Journal Article
Closed access
MLMeifeng Luo
Meifeng Luo
LFLixian Fan
Lixian Fan
LLLiming Liu
Liming Liu
This article presents an econometric analysis for the fluctuation of the container freight rate due to the interactions between the demand for container transportation services and the container fleet capacity. The demand is derived from international trade and is assumed to be exogenous, while the fleet capacity increases with new orders made two years before, proportional to the industrial profit. Assuming the market clears each year, the shipping freight rate will change with the relative magnitude of shifts in the demand and fleet capacity. This model is estimated using the world container shipping market statistics from 1980 to 2008, applying the three-stage least square method. The estimated parameters of the model have high statistical significance, and the overall explanatory power of the model is above 90%. The short-term in-sample prediction of the model can largely replicate the container shipping market fluctuation in terms of the fleet size dynamics and the freight rate fluctuation in the past 20 years. The prediction of the future market trend reveals that the container freight rate should continue to decrease in the coming three years if the demand for container transportation services grows at less than 8%.

1 September 2001 in IIE Transactions
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZLZhaotong Lian
Zhaotong Lian
LLLiming Liu
Liming Liu
We consider continuous review perishable inventory models with renewal batch demands. Assuming zero lead time, we construct an embedded Markov chain. With a probabilistic approach, we derive a closed-form long run average cost function under the (s, S) replenishment policy. Numerical analysis is then used to identify the properties of the cost function and to demonstrate the impacts of changing batch sizes and other system parameters. Based on these results, a heuristic approach to handle problems with positive lead times is proposed. The performance of the heuristics against simulation results demonstrates its effectiveness and accuracy