S. Abhishek Anand

S. Abhishek Anand

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S. Abhishek Anand

Computer Science, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama United States 35294

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 July 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SAS. Abhishek Anand
S. Abhishek Anand
NSNitesh Saxena
Nitesh Saxena
Pairing between wireless devices may be secured by the use of an auxiliary channel such as audio, visuals or vibrations. A simple approach to pairing involves one of the devices initiating the transmission of a key, or keying material like a short password, over the auxiliary channel to the other device. A successful pairing is achieved when the receiving device is able to decode the key without any errors while the attacker is unable to eavesdrop the key. In this paper, we focus on the security of the vibration channel when used for the key transmission. As shown in some recent work, sending the keying material over a clear vibrational channel poses a significant risk of an acoustic side channel attack. Specifically, an adversary can listen onto the acoustic sounds generated by the vibration motor of the sending device and infer the keying material with a high accuracy. To counteract this threat, we propose a novel pairing scheme, called Vibreaker (a ``Vibrating speaker''), that involves active injection of acoustic noise in order to mask the key signal. In this scheme, the sending device artificially injects noise in the otherwise clear audio channel while transmitting the keying material via vibrations. We experiment with several choices for the noise signal and demonstrate that the security of the audio channel is significantly enhanced with Vibreaker when appropriate noise is used. The scheme requires no additional effort by the user, and imposes minimum hardware requirement and hence can be applied to many different contexts, such as pairing of IoT and implanted devices, wearables and other commodity gadgets.

1 October 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SAS Abhishek Anand
S Abhishek Anand
NSNitesh Saxena
Nitesh Saxena
Internet of Things (IoT) is embodied by smart network-enabled devices that utilize computing power, networking, and miniaturization for richer and improved user experience. Due to their interconnectedness, ubiquitous nature and low computational power, trustworthy and secure communication between IoT devices is a security concern. For device authentication, "pairing" may be secured by using an auxiliary channel such as audio, visual and vibrations for sharing the key or keying material between the IoT devices. In this paper, we evaluate the security of vibration channel, susceptible to an acoustic eavesdropper that can capture audio leakage from the vibrations of the transmitting IoT device. We propose a noisy vibration scheme for cloaking vibration sounds during pairing against such attacks. The scheme only requires a speaker for emitting the masking sound during key transmission. We evaluate the scheme in proximity, co-located and remote settings with an eavesdropping attacker. We also study motion sensor exploits against this scheme and compliment it with additional measures to mask vibration effects on motion sensors. Our scheme is user transparent and requires only a speaker (may already be present on the device), so it can be readily implemented in the IoT setting, smart wearables, and other commodity gadgets.

18 July 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
PSPrakash Shrestha
Prakash Shrestha
SAS Abhishek Anand
S Abhishek Anand
NSNitesh Saxena
Nitesh Saxena
Deauthentication is an important component of any computing system that promises to offer legitimate access to restricted services residing on the system. As computing devices are ubiquitous, it has underscored the need to design zero-effort deauthentication systems from a usability perspective. While the design of such deauthentication systems is geared towards making them more usable, often the security implication of these deigns overlook the physical security of the system resulting in various side channel vulnerabilities in the system. This issue highlights the need to design a defense mechanism that is capable of minimizing the threat posed by such side channel attacks while having minimal impact on the design of the system. In this paper, we aim to address the sound-based vulnerability recently introduced in the literature, against one of the prominent zero-effort deauthentication schemes, called ZEBRA, that transparently and continuously authenticates the user using a wearable device wirelessly connected with the authentication terminal. To this end, we propose YELP, a novel and practical defense mechanism based on the principle of sound masking. YELP uses two different types of masking sounds, namely \"white noise\", and \"music\" for cloaking the acoustic side channel leakage underlying the ZEBRA system. We believe that the use of such masking sounds at a reasonable volume level can hide the acoustic leakage emanating from the physical component of the system, and thereby reduce, if not eliminate, the imposed sound-based vulnerability. Indeed, our results show that white noise, as a masking sound, can effectively hide the acoustic leakage from ZEBRA system, thereby significantly reducing the attack success rate of an audio-based side channel attacker while music can moderately hide the acoustic leakage from the system. Our work therefore shows that sound masking can be used as an effective tool in improving the security of (de)authentication systems against an audio-based side channel attack without affecting its original design and without requiring additional effort from the user.