Daniel R. Thomas

Daniel R. Thomas

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Daniel R. Thomas

University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SPSergio Pastrana
Sergio Pastrana
DTDaniel R. Thomas
Daniel R. Thomas
AHAlice Hutchings
Alice Hutchings
RCRichard Clayton
Richard Clayton

12 October 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DTDaniel R. Thomas
Daniel R. Thomas
ABAlastair R. Beresford
Alastair R. Beresford
ARAndrew Rice
Andrew Rice
The security of Android depends on the timely delivery of updates to fix critical vulnerabilities. In this paper we map the complex network of players in the Android ecosystem who must collaborate to provide updates, and determine that inaction by some manufacturers and network operators means many handsets are vulnerable to critical vulnerabilities. We define the FUM security metric to rank the performance of device manufacturers and network operators, based on their provision of updates and exposure to critical vulnerabilities. Using a corpus of 20 400 devices we show that there is significant variability in the timely delivery of security updates across different device manufacturers and network operators. This provides a comparison point for purchasers and regulators to determine which device manufacturers and network operators provide security updates and which do not. We find that on average 87.7% of Android devices are exposed to at least one of 11 known critical vulnerabilities and, across the ecosystem as a whole, assign a FUM security score of 2.87 out of 10. In our data, Nexus devices do considerably better than average with a score of 5.17; and LG is the best manufacturer with a score of 3.97.

1 November 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
DTDaniel R. Thomas
Daniel R. Thomas
SPSergio Pastrana
Sergio Pastrana
AHAlice Hutchings
Alice Hutchings
RCRichard Clayton
Richard Clayton
ABAlastair R. Beresford
Alastair R. Beresford

1 April 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
DTDaniel R. Thomas
Daniel R. Thomas
RCRichard Clayton
Richard Clayton
ABAlastair R. Beresford
Alastair R. Beresford
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks employing reflected UDP amplification are regularly used to disrupt networks and systems. The amplification allows one rented server to generate significant volumes of data, while the reflection hides the identity of the attacker. Consequently this is an attractive, low risk, strategy for criminals bent on vandalism and extortion. To measure the uptake of this strategy we analyse the results of running a network of honeypot UDP reflectors (median size 65 nodes) from July 2014 onwards. We explore the life cycle of attacks that use our reflectors, from the scanning phase used to detect our honeypot machines, through to their use in attacks. We see a median of 1 450 malicious scanners per day across all UDP protocols, and have recorded details of 5.18 million subsequent attacks involving in excess of 3.31 trillion packets. Using a capture-recapture statistical technique, we estimate that our reflectors can see between 85.1% and 96.6% of UDP reflection attacks over our measurement period.

21 October 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
BCBen Collier
Ben Collier
DTDaniel R. Thomas
Daniel R. Thomas
RCRichard Clayton
Richard Clayton
AHAlice Hutchings
Alice Hutchings

21 October 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SPSergio Pastrana
Sergio Pastrana
AHAlice Hutchings
Alice Hutchings
DTDaniel Thomas
Daniel Thomas
JTJuan Tapiador
Juan Tapiador